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INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 2002, the City of Toledo, Ohio issued a warrant for the arrest of
resident Paul Tellings on the charge of violating the limitation on harboring vicious
dogs.1 Both the Toledo ordinance and Ohio state law in effect in 2002 labeled “pit
bull” type dogs per se vicious purely based on their visual identification.2 Toledo’s
ordinance specifically limited citizens to only one “vicious” dog per household.3 Dur-
ing a routine lead-based paint inspection4 in Tellings’s home, the health inspector noted
three dogs that looked like pit bulls in the household, reported it to the dog warden,5
and set in motion a legal action that proceeded all the way through the state’s highest
court, and ended in a denial of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.6
* Ann L. Schiavone is an Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of Law.
1 Case Information, VALLIE BOWMAN—ENG. CLERK CT., http://www.tmc-clerk.com
/case information/criminaltraffic/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WNG3-HQHD] (search in
“Case Number” search bar for “CRB-02-15267”; then click link for Case Number “CRB-02-
15267-0104”).
2 TOLEDO, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 505.14 (repealed Oct. 12, 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 955.11, 955.22 (repealed 2012).
3 § 505.14.
4 Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2006), rev’d, 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007).
5 Id.
6 See Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings II), 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007), cert. denied, 2008
U.S. LEXIS 2006 (Feb. 19, 2008).
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The Tellings’s three dogs had exhibited no history of aggression or violence.7
No prior allegations of bites or attacks were laid upon their doorstep.8 Not even the
health inspector claimed any of the three dogs stepped a paw out of line during the
inspection.9 Their only crime was their appearance.10 Prior to seizure of the dogs,
Tellings was able to transfer ownership of one of his dogs to keep it safe, and he was
permitted to keep another under the ordinance.11 The dog warden seized and de-
stroyed the third.12 Instead of quietly taking his punishment for violating the ordi-
nance, Tellings challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio statute, claiming it
violated procedural and substantive due process, as well as equal protection under
both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.13
While this case was not the first nor the last in the country to challenge the
constitutionality of breed-specific canine laws, Toledo v. Tellings14 is unique in that
its robust procedural history and opinions at both the court of appeals level and the
Ohio Supreme Court illustrate a very real tension existing in rational basis analysis
under the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.15 Namely, the opinions stand for very different views of how rational basis
analysis should be conducted.16 The Ohio Supreme Court championed the view of
the rational basis test as essentially a rubber stamp of approval for any legislative act
that does not violate a specific fundamental right or disadvantage a particular sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class.17 On the other hand, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the
Sixth District applied a meaningful rational basis test, analyzing whether the means
utilized to achieve the purported legislative goal were rationally related to that
7 Tellings I, 2006 WL 513946, at *1.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at *5–6.
14 Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings II ), 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007); Toledo v. Tellings
(Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2006).
15 See Tellings I, 2006 WL 513946; Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d 1152.
16 Compare Tellings I, 2006 WL 513946, at *11 (opining, after reviewing the evidence
present in the record and the municipal court ruling, that when “a specific breed does not
inherently represent a greater danger than any other breed, a law that regulates that breed on
the basis of mere ownership is arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory”), with Tellings
II, 871 N.E.2d at 1157 (opining, with only minimal attention to the expert witness testimony
in the record that “[t]he state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens
against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls”).
17 See Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d at 1158 (“Laws limiting rights, other than fundamental
rights, are constitutional with respect to substantive due process and equal protection if the
laws are rationally related to a legitimate goal of government.”).
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intended goal.18 Unsurprisingly, these analyses resulted in markedly different out-
comes.19 The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately upheld the state law that classified
dogs as vicious based on appearance, overturning the court of appeals ruling that
such classification was not rationally related to public health, safety, or welfare.20
While the “rubber-stamp” approach of the Ohio Supreme Court prevailed in Tellings,
this was certainly not the final word on rational basis analysis generally, nor is it
likely the last word on canine breed-specific laws specifically.21 The tension be-
tween the application of traditional rational basis and meaningful rational basis is
not new.22 It is a symptom of the fundamental tension existing since the Founding
between support for the broad police power of the government and the desire to
protect the rights of the individual.23
Since the decision in Tellings, the United States Supreme Court has provided
more evidence that meaningful rational basis analysis is alive and well and, perhaps,
gaining momentum.24 Specifically, the gay marriage cases of United States v.
Windsor,25 decided in 2013, and Obergefell v. Hodges,26 decided in 2015, lend
18 See Tellings I, 2006 WL 513946, at *11 (“We agree that the protection of property and
people from injuries by dogs is clearly a legitimate governmental interest. Nevertheless, this
interest must bear a rational or ‘real and substantial relationship’ to the conduct being
regulated by the statute, in this case the mere ownership of pit bulls.”).
19 Compare id. at *12 (“[W]e conclude that both R.C. 955.22, 955.11 (A)(4)(a)(iii) and
T.M.C. § 505.14(a), which relied on the now disproved presumption that pit bulls, as a breed,
are inherently dangerous, are unconstitutional since they lack a rational or real and substantial
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”), with Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d at 1159 (“We
hold that the state of Ohio and the city of Toledo have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens
from the dangers associated with pit bulls, and that R.C. 955.11 (A)(4)(a)(iii), 955.22 and
Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 are rationally related to that interest and are constitutional.”).
20 Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d at 1159.
21 See Dias v. City of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding plaintiff
dog owners affected by Denver’s pit bull ban had, under a rational basis analysis, “alleged
a substantive due process violation sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim”). Following this decision by the Tenth Circuit, the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, on remand, also ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on this issue of
summary judgment, finding “a reasonable trier of fact may find that Plaintiffs’ experts are
correct and there exists no rational basis for a breed specific ordinance.” Dias v. City of
Denver, No. 07-CV-00722-WDM-MSW, 2010 WL 3873004, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2010)
(order denying summary judgment).
22 See Aaron Belzner, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 339, 346–54 (2014).
23 See discussion infra Part II.
24 See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Belzner, supra note
22, at 348–54.
25 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
26 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601–08 (2015). “While the opinion does not specifically apply a
rational basis analysis, it eschews development of the law by ‘formula’ and avoids many of
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support to this argument. When viewed in concert with previous gay rights cases of
Romer v. Evans27 and Lawrence v. Texas,28 as well as other cases that have employed
similar analyses, such as United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno29 and
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,30 this recent case law may be
signaling the rise of meaningful rational basis review of laws under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, at least under certain circumstances.31 Since the decision
in Moreno in 1973, scholars have debated what issues and circumstances would
prompt the Supreme Court to employ meaningful rational basis.32 Now, over forty
years later, we have more evidence to show that the Court seems willing to strike
down a law under a more thorough rational basis analysis upon the presence of three
specific factors.33 First, the law in question must, at least in a general sense, impinge
upon a fundamental right.34 Second, the law must be based, at least in part, on
animus of the community.35 Lastly, ample sociological or empirical data should be
available to show no rational relationship between the goals of the statute and the
means used to achieve it.36
While there is no absolute assurance that meaningful rational basis will be
employed more regularly by the Court, the body of law has grown enough in recent
years to reveal the similarities noted above, and to draw analogies in other con-
texts.37 In this Article, I argue that canine breed-specific laws of the type challenged
in Toledo v. Tellings should be reviewed under meaningful rational basis. Impor-
tantly, should the Supreme Court review a breed-specific law, it would not be the
the trappings of traditional tiered-scrutiny analysis, focusing instead on the lofty goals of
‘liberty’ and ‘equality.’” Ann L. Schiavone, Unleashing the Fourteenth Amendment, 2016
WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 27, 33 (2016), http://wisconsinlawreview.org/unleashing-the-fourteenth
-amendment [https://perma.cc/XJ86-EM7Y].
27 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an Amendment to the Colorado constitution,
“Amendment 2,” violated the Equal Protection Clause when subjected to a rational basis
standard of review).
28 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law that criminalized homosexual inter-
course was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional).
29 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (finding that legislative classification was a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group and could not constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest).
30 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding that Cleburne’s ordinance was too broad to overcome the
suspicion that the ordinance rested “on a bare desire to treat the retarded as outsiders”).
31 Schiavone, supra note 26, at 27.
32 See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 615 (2000).
33 Schiavone, supra note 26, at 33.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2006).
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first time that the Court has reviewed canine law under the Fourteenth Amendment.38
In the 1897 case of Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad,39 the United
States Supreme Court found that the regulation of dogs is a valid exercise of police
power.40 However, the Court left the door open to invalidate certain types of dog
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.41
In order to prove that meaningful rational basis analysis is justifiable under the
Constitution, and that canine breed-specific laws are an ideal subject for that
analysis via the Fourteenth Amendment, we must first explore how we got here.
How did Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence develop such that the Court has the
power to review state laws, and how has it been applied to canine law specifically?
Only then can we explore how the Court might respond to breed-specific laws now.
Part I of this Article begins with a reconsideration of the conventional interpretation
of the primary Fourteenth Amendment dog law case, Sentell v. New Orleans &
Carrollton Railroad, to show that the legislative power over dogs was never in-
tended to be unlimited, and that judicial review of dog law is legitimate under
certain circumstances. Part II explores the history of the police power and legitimacy
of judicial review as a check on that power since the Founding. Part III considers the
development of judicial review of state legislative action following the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the rise of legal realism principles as a
legitimate means of supporting or invalidating laws and the establishment of the
rational basis test. Part IV discusses the shift in Fourteenth Amendment analysis
away from a rubber-stamp approach to most legislative action, toward meaningful
rational basis review, with special focus on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinions in
the gay rights cases. Finally, in Part V, I show why courts should apply a meaningful
rational basis analysis to breed-specific laws and why those laws may fail rational basis.
Specifically, this Article shows that breed-specific cases may share many common
characteristics with other cases where the Supreme Court has employed this height-
ened analysis and invalidated those laws.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FIRST REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF DOGS
Ratified in July of 1868 as one of three amendments to the Constitution pro-
posed and ratified in the wake of the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment provided
38 See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
39 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
40 Id. at 704. The “police power” is generally defined as the right of the sovereign to
govern men and things. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (7 How.) 504,
527–28 (1847), overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). A more modern
term for this concept is legislative power. See Robert F. Williams, Comment: On the Impor-
tance of A Theory of Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15 QLR 57, 61 (1995).
41 See infra Part I.
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protection to citizens against certain actions of individual states.42 At the close of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with many questions
concerning the interpretation and applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
what power it granted (or did not grant) to courts to invalidate state legislation that
violated individual rights of citizens.43 Within this context, the Supreme Court took up
a case concerning the intersection of dog law and Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad in 1897. Since then, Sentell
has become the singular starting point for almost any constitutional question in dog
law and is therefore a necessary focus for the inquiry of this Article.44 I make no
argument that Sentell was wrongly decided under the circumstances, however the
following discussion will attempt to show that courts have extrapolated the rationale
of the case beyond its original application. Rather than blindly citing it in new
contexts, Sentell deserves a fresh look.
Sentell arose from a dog owner’s action to recover damages from the New
Orleans Railroad for the death of a valuable Newfoundland bitch which he kept for
breeding purposes.45 The owner took the dog for a walk while she was pregnant with
a litter of puppies.46 The dog stopped on railroad tracks and was hit and killed by an
electric car.47 The owner sued the railroad for negligence in the death of the dog.48
The facts of the case itself were not at issue in the Supreme Court case.49 Instead, the
Court had only to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute used
by the railroad as an affirmative defense.50 The statute required that dogs owned by
citizens be registered with the tax assessor as personal property, and that a value be
42 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 59 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting):
These amendments are all consequences of the late civil war. The
prejudices and apprehension as to the central government which pre-
vailed when the Constitution was adopted were dispelled by the light of
experience. The public mind became satisfied that there was less danger
of tyranny in the head than of anarchy and tyranny in the members.
43 DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 91–92 (2011) [hereinafter REHABILI-
TATING LOCHNER] (discussing the slow development and controversy of employment of the
Fourteenth Amendment as “protection for civil liberties” against infringement by the states).
44 See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 (1920) (upholding a law requiring dog
licenses as a valid exercise of police power); Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 204
(4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing property rights in dogs for Fourth Amendment purposes);
Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (upholding an owner’s property
right in his dog, even when unlicensed); Thiele v. City of Denver, 312 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo.
1957) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting dogs from running-at-large as a valid exercise of
police power).
45 Sentell, 166 U.S. at 700.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 698.
49 Id. at 700.
50 Id.
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assigned to the dog.51 Upon such registration, the owner would be given personal
property rights in the dog up to the value assigned by the owner on the tax rolls.52
Since the dog owner never registered the Newfoundland, the statute indicated he
was not entitled to recovery for the death of the dog.53 The dog owner then argued
that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his property
without due process.54
The Court began its opinion by recounting that, at common law, dogs are very
different than other types of domesticated animals, and a person’s property interest
in them is “imperfect.”55 The right of property in a dog lay somewhere between wild
animals not owned until they are captured or killed, and domestic animals like
horses, cows, sheep, pigs etc., “in which the right of property is perfect and com-
plete.”56 The Court further specified several reasons for why dogs and “domestic
animals” differ in their status as property.57 First, dogs have no “intrinsic value”
according to the Court, because they have no common use as either labor or food.58
Rather, they are generally kept for “pleasure, curiosity or caprice.”59 Further, dogs
as a species encompassed a wide range of differences, including both positive and
negative characteristics.60 The Court stressed that while some dogs “rank among the
noblest representatives of the animal kingdom,”61 others are “little better than a
public nuisance”62 and that all dogs, noble or nuisance, are “subject to attacks of
hydrophobic madness.”63 Thus the Court set up the dichotomy of the dog in Sentell—a
community should be able to protect the good ones through the force of law, and be
able to destroy the bad ones with no consequence under the law.64
The Court then argued that because it is “practically impossible by statute to
distinguish between the different breeds, or between the valuable and the worthless,”65
states may draw upon their police power to regulate ownership of dogs.66 The Court
theorized that if an owner values a dog sufficiently, he or she will comply with
51 Id. at 698–700.
52 Id. at 698.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 699.
55 Id. at 701.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. (likening dogs to parrots, monkeys, cats, and birds).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 701–02.
65 Id. at 701.
66 Id. at 701–02.
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reasonable regulation and thus protect the animal and distinguish it from worthless
or ferocious ones of which the community may seek to rid itself.67
To support its rationale, the Court cited to numerous cases upholding statutes
that promote the killing of dogs not under the protection of owners.68 Evidence of
the failure to protect a dog included failure to place a collar on the dog, failure to
license the dog, or allowing the animal to wander off the owner’s property.69 These
regulations were consistent with policy objectives explained by the Court: protect
the good and eliminate the bad.70 These regulations were also consistent with tradi-
tional notions of police power, which focused on eliminating nuisance while pro-
tecting personal property rights.71
The second group of cases the Court pointed to in defense of the assertion that
personal property, at times, is subject to police power concerned the destruction of
property when it becomes dangerous.72 Examples included food stuffs that have de-
cayed or become rancid and are dangerous to public health, clothing which may spread
illness or infection, or homes that are structurally dangerous.73 In its reasoned
approach, none of the Court’s citations suggested that property can be taken or
destroyed “just because.”74
Ultimately, the opinion validated the argument that regulation of dogs is under
the police power of the state.75 However, the opinion did not suggest that this power
is limitless.76 Specifically, the Court admitted that the destruction of personal property
without due process very well may violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless there
is an immediate danger that warrants summary destruction of the property.77 The
Court even went so far as to suggest that the Louisiana statutory requirement of dog
registration on the tax rolls, and a New Orleans ordinance requiring all dogs be
67 Id. at 702.
68 Id. at 702–04.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 701–02.
71 Id. at 701 (stating that some dogs are “little better than a public nuisance”). As will be
discussed in the next section, police power in the nineteenth century and before focused on
eliminating nuisance. See infra Part II. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that
focus progressed to using the police power to promote goals of heath, safety, and welfare.
See discussion infra Part II.
72 Sentell, 166 U.S. at 704–05.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 706.
76 Id. at 705.
77 Id. Today, the idea of dogs as constitutionally protected property is well-established.
Numerous United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have opined that dogs are subject to Fourth
Amendment protection and the unjustified shooting of a dog by the police is subject to a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 200–03 (4th
Cir. 2003) (analyzing the history of the law of dogs as property and concluding that dogs are sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment protection as “effects”); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205,
209–10 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that dogs are “effects” subject to Fourth Amendment protection).
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licensed by the treasurer, were “more than ordinarily stringent,”78 and if they were
applied to other domestic animals they could very well be held unconstitutional.79
A careful reading of Sentell suggests the case does not support breed-specific
laws at all.80 While the Court believed some dogs are valuable and others worthless,
differentiating the valuable from the worthless was clearly not tied to breed.81 Instead,
the Court tied this differentiation to an owner’s willingness to jump through certain
hoops to claim ownership.82 If a dog is good and valuable, the owner will obtain the
license or register the dog with the tax office.83 Once such dominion is exercised, due
process rights attach.84 The traditional concept of police power pervades this opinion.85
It is police power used as a means of eliminating nuisance, while protecting the prop-
erty rights of people who do no harm, not a police power that authorizes a state to enter
a person’s home and confiscate dogs with no history of viciousness or dangerousness.86
Additionally, the Court made the point that it is “practically impossible”87 to
differentiate dogs based on breed or “between the valuable and the worthless” via stat-
ute,88 thus reasonable regulations must be applied to all dogs.89 What the Court consid-
ered “reasonable” is clear through the examples used: leash laws, licensing laws, and
destruction of dogs that pose imminent danger.90 Nothing in this opinion supports
rounding up and destroying a particular breed or a type of dog.91 Breed-specific laws
attempt to do what the Sentell Court calls “impossible.”92 As I will discuss later in
Part V, the Court’s instincts were correct here; studies show even persons who work
in canine-related fields cannot accurately or consistently identify breeds.93
78 Sentell, 166 U.S. at 706.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 698–706.
81 Id. at 701.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 706 (“The statute really puts a premium upon valuable dogs, by giving them a
recognized position, and by permitting the owner to put his own estimate upon them.”).
84 Id.
85 See id. at 701, 706.
86 See id. at 702–04 (discussing numerous cases where the police power was used to
justify the elimination of dogs that became a nuisance by virtue of violating regulations, like
being found without a collar, while protecting the property rights of people who followed the
regulation and collared the found dog).
87 Id. at 701.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 702–04.
91 See id.
92 Id. at 701 (noting that “it is practically impossible by statute to distinguish between the
different breeds”).
93 K.R. Olson et al., Inconsistent Identification of Pit Bull-Type Dogs by Shelter Staff, 206
VETERINARY J. 197, 199–200 (2015); Victoria L. Voith et al., Comparison of Visual and
DNA Breed Identification of Dogs and Inter-Observer Reliability, 3 AM. J. SOC. RES. 17, 20,
24 (2013).
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Since 1897, at least some of our attitudes towards dogs have progressed.94 Ameri-
can dogs have moved from “the barnyard to the backyard to the bedroom—and into
the bed itself.”95 In 2015, it was estimated that the United States spent over $60
billion on the care of pets.96 An estimated 54.4 million households in the United
States care for 77.8 million dogs.97 We have dog parks and dog spas; we have pet
sitters and pet hotels; we make bucket lists for our canine companions.98 At the same
time, our dog laws, at least where breed-specific laws are applicable, have devolved.99
Owners of targeted breeds have no opportunity to prove the “worthiness” of their
individual dogs.100 Owners of targeted breeds are treated differently than other dog
owners under these laws.101 Both due process and equal protection are arguably
infringed upon, yet few courts have undertaken an analysis that does more than
quote a few choice lines from Sentell, and miss the point of the case.102
As we will see in later sections, Sentell was decided just as the Court began to
explore meaningful review of state statutes under due process and equal protection
analysis.103 Acknowledging the statutes in question were “more than ordinarily
stringent”104 the Court implied that property rights in animals (even dogs) can im-
plicate Fourteenth Amendment protections.105 How then would the Sentell Court
have viewed statutes that more egregiously violate due process and equal protection
94 See generally Marty Becker, Should Our Puppy Sleep with Us, or Be Banned from the
Bedroom?, HUFFPOST HEALTHY LIVING (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/10/21/dog-in-bed-sleep-bedroom_n_1957972.html [https://perma.cc/56N3-STQB] (“In
my lifetime, and in my more than three decades as a practicing veterinarian, I have seen dogs
move from the barnyard to the backyard to the bedroom . . . .”); Hal Herzog, Should Pets Be
Banished from the Bedroom?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 22, 2014), http://www.psychology
today.com/blog/animals-and-us/201407/should-pets-be-banished-the-bedroom [https://perma
.cc/P9VY-5QDS] (stating that “about 70 percent of American dogs . . . at least occasionally
share their owner’s bed”).
95 Becker, supra note 94.
96 Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics, AM. PET PRODUCTS ASS’N, http://
www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp [https://perma.cc/XQN2-U7Q6].
97 Id.
98 Subaru, 2016 Subaru Impreza—Subaru Commercial—Dream Weekend (July 1, 2015),
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aerv5xYhz2k.
99 See generally Vanatar v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Colo.
Dog Fanciers v. City of Denver, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991).
100 See generally Colo. Dog Fanciers, 820 P.2d 644.
101 See Vanatar, 717 F. Supp. 1236; Colo. Dog Fanciers, 820 P.2d 644.
102 See Vanatar, 717 F. Supp. at 1241–42 (opining that Sentell stands for a virtually unlimited
police power over dogs); Colo. Dog Fanciers, 820 P.2d at 653 (holding that the ruling in
Sentell, that dogs are proper subjects of the police power, justifies breed-specific laws).
103 REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 43, at 14 (noting that during the late nineteenth
century, courts began to “use [ ] both the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses as
textual hooks” to review class legislation and enforce natural rights).
104 Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 706 (1897).
105 Id.
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than the ones discussed in the case? Sentell absolutely stands for the proposition that
dogs are properly regulated under the police power, but it does not support unrea-
sonable or irrational laws.106
Most importantly, the opinion in Sentell implicitly acknowledges that dog law
is a viable subject for Fourteenth Amendment inquiry.107 While many courts have
parroted quotes from Sentell to support breed-specific laws,108 in context, the whole
of the opinion is not a straightforward endorsement of such laws and, in fact, pro-
vides support for an opposing view.109 Now that it is clear that the primary Supreme
Court authority on dog law under the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide
blanket support for breed-specific laws,110 we can turn our attention to considering
why courts can and should overturn such laws under the Constitution. The next Part
will begin with the Founding, and explore the idea that judicial review of legislative
acts has long been a principle of United States government, even before the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. THE FOUNDING, THE POLICE POWER, AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of legislative acts is not a new phenomenon.111 The tension
between robust legislative power and a strong judiciary has existed in the United
States since the Founding.112 Through the Constitution, the United States uniquely
limits governmental power through Constitutional mechanisms.113 Like the govern-
mental form of “rock-paper-scissors-lizard-Spock,”114 the division of governmental
106 Id. at 704, 706.
107 Id. at 705.
108 Vanatar v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (quoting Sentell
for the proposition that dog regulation falls under the police power); State v. Peters, 534 So.
2d 760, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Sentell to validate a pit bull restriction).
109 Sentell, 166 U.S. at 706.
110 Id.
111 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (espousing the concept
of judicial review for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion).
112 Id. at 152 (noting that Justices “conceive themselves to be duly appointed justices of
the peace, and they believe it to be their duty to maintain the rights of their office, and not
to suffer them to be violated by the hand of power”).
113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 222 (James Madison) (Thompson & Homans eds., 1831).
To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several depart-
ments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be
given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate,
the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of
the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Id.
114 Rock-paper-scissors is a decision-making game, defined as
a method of selecting, for example, which of two people perform a
task: each person simultaneously makes one of three hand gestures
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power among three branches and two levels of government prevents any one person
or group from wielding too much power.115 The Constitution limits the powers
available to the national government,116 then splits the ability to make, enforce, and
interpret law amongst three separate branches.117 While prevailing wisdom claims
that the Founders saw the judicial branch as the weakest of the three,118 it is certain
that at least some of the Federalists believed the judiciary would have a role in
reviewing laws for their constitutionality and acting as a valid check on unwise
populist sentiment which sometimes arises from legislatures.119
The Founders innately understood the problem of legislatures left completely
unchecked.120 Specifically, in Federalist Paper 78, Alexander Hamilton charged the
judiciary of the new nation:
[T]o guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the
effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information and more deliberate reflection,
representing a rock, a sheet of paper, and a pair of scissors respectively.
Each gesture defeats one and is defeated by one of the other two: rock
defeats scissors but is defeated by paper; paper defeats rock but is de-
feated by scissors. The person whose gesture defeats the other is selected.
Rock-Paper-Scissors, COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary
/english/rock-paper-scissors [https://perma.cc/QB9F-ETYG]. Rock-paper-scissors-lizard-
Spock is a new expansion of the traditional decision-making game, invented by Sam Kass
and Karen Bryla, that adds two additional options in an effort to reduce the likelihood of ties.
Rock Paper Scissors Spock Lizard, SAMKASS.COM, http://www.samkass.com/theories
/RPSSL.html [https://perma.cc/6H8Q-KYPB]. The second game compares favorably with
the limitation of government through separation of powers and federalism, dividing govern-
mental power between three branches and two levels, thus five different sources of power,
each, at times, trumping another and being trumped themselves.
115 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 113, at 224 (James Madison).
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate depart-
ments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other; at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1990).
119 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 336 (Alexander Hamilton) (Thompson & Homans eds.,
1831).
120 Id.
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have a tendency in the meantime to occasion dangerous innova-
tions in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
party in the community.121
He further reasoned that “no man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the
victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day.”122 Hamilton
wisely anticipated one of the fundamental problems with democratic (or republican)
government—tyranny of the majority.123
The single governmental power most prone to abuse via tyranny of the majority is
the broadest and most all-encompassing, and yet is also the least restricted and equally
least understood of all governmental powers—the legislative power, also called the
police power.124 Under American jurisprudence, the police power has provided the basis
to uphold such varied laws as regulations of flammable materials, nuisance ordinances,
liquor control regulations, and vaccination laws.125 It is the power which allows gov-
ernments, in the most general sense, to manage its citizens,126 but it is also the power
which most readily provides governments with the vehicle to abuse and subjugate its
citizens.127 Both state and federal courts have rationalized and accepted abhorrent hu-
man rights violations encompassed in eugenics laws128 and “Jim Crow” laws129 under
the guise of police power.130 Historically, state and local governments have used the po-
lice power as a crowbar to pry open the front doors and bedroom doors of citizens,131
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id. For more on the concept of the “tyranny of the majority,” see ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248–52 (Henry Reeve trans., 1965) (1835).
124 See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES § 1 (F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1886). The term ‘police power’ is
used more frequently in older case law, while ‘legislative power’ is the more modern term.
This Article will employ both terms, interchangeably.
125 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding the requirement of vaccina-
tions for smallpox, a deadly disease, to be within the purview of the police power); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that the regulation of liquor is within the traditional
police power); see Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 504 (1878) (“By the settled doctrines
of this court the police power extends, at least, to the protection of the lives, the health, and
the property of the community against the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own rights.”).
126 See TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 2.
127 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 119, at 336 (Alexander Hamilton).
128 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that mandatory sterilization for in-
tellectually disabled was acceptable under state police power).
129 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a law requiring separate
railroad cars for whites and non-whites as valid under the police power). But see Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning “separate but equal” doctrine established in
Plessy as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
130 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
131 See Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process,
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outlaw family planning practices,132 prohibit various forms of sexual expression,133
and even restrict cohabitation of unrelated individuals.134
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s definition of the police power exemplifies the broad
scope historically granted to this power, even in a society of “limited” government.135
Taney argued that the police powers are:
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a
State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to es-
tablish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be re-
corded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every
case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits
of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates . . . .136
Such a broad definition points to the primary reason why the police power is so
vulnerable to abuse.137 Whoever holds the police power, in a particular society
where such power is broadly defined, ultimately holds the power to rule and govern
anyone and anything within the bounds of that society.138 Ostensibly such power to
rule and govern could have no limit.
The origins of the police power have been traced back to the very foundations of
Western political thought—the Greek city-states and Roman law.139 In the Western
world, perhaps the power hit its high watermark in feudal Europe when the king
93 TEX. L. REV. 275 (2014) (discussing the interplay of the police power with the evolving
theories of personal liberty that developed in the mid-twentieth century).
132 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”).
133 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a criminal law against sodomy
based on principle of the police power), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (finding the Texas law criminalizing same-sex sexual intimacy to be a violation of
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
134 See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance
restricting dwelling occupancy to traditional families and stating, “[t]he police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.”).
135 Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (7 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 See TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 2.
139 Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Power to Govern Men and Things”: Patriarchal Origins
of the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (2004).
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owned everything and all power to govern ultimately came from him, which he then
delegated among his lords, but which the king could take back at any time for any
reason.140 Ultimately, however, the origins of the police power may most closely
align with the origins of society itself, for it cannot be denied that the police power
is the source  of any government’s ability to govern its people and the things within
its borders.141
For instance, the social contract philosophers, including John Locke, Thomas
Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, agreed142 that in entering the “social con-
tract”143 individuals gave up certain freedoms and rights to govern themselves in the
state of nature in order to have the benefits and protections associated with living in
a community.144 One key difference in their theories revolved around the question
of whether all individual rights must be forfeited to the government under the social
contract.145 Hobbes believed that an individual gives up most rights and power in
order to benefit from the protection of the commonwealth, the society.146
John Locke, however, arguably the social contract philosopher whose ideas
wielded the most influence on the founding of the United States, insisted that the
police power had limits and that some freedoms and powers cannot be taken from
the individual, including life, liberty, and property.147 The American system of
140 Id.
141 TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 2.
142 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (1999) (discussing the general views of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, and the appli-
cations of those views in American jurisprudence).
143 “Social contract” is defined as “an actual or hypothetical agreement among individuals
forming an organized society or between the community and the ruler that defines and limits
the rights and duties of each.” Social Contract Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20contract [https://perma.cc/F5M6-7KWH].
144 Sharon A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Political and Moral Philosophy,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/
[https://perma.cc/H2JV-BLMC].
145 Allen, supra note 142, at 8.
146 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. XVII (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651). Hobbes,
in describing the source of the power of the sovereign notes the following:
For by this [a]uthorit[y], given him by every particular man in the
Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much [p]ower and [s]trength con-
ferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is [e]nabled to forme the wills
of them all, to [p]eace at home, and mutual[ ] a[i]d against their enemies
abroad. And in him consisteth the [e]ssence of the Commonwealth; which
(to define it,) is [o]ne [p]erson, of whose [a]cts a great [m]ultitude, by
mutual [c]ovenants one with another, have made themselves every one
the [a]uthor, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all,
as he shall think expedient, for their [p]eace and [c]ommon [d]efen[s]e.
Id. at 143–44.
147 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 162–67 (1690).
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government, so radical in its nascence, recognized similar unalienable rights which
no government may take.148
“[A]y, there’s the rub.”149 If it is agreed, that all governments, to be effective,
must hold “the power to govern men and things,”150 and such power, generally called
the police power, is by its origins and its historical application nearly limitless,151
how can a government like the United States, founded on limited governmental power,
be truly limited and yet hold this “limitless” police power? Contrarily, to be an effective
government, how can it not?152 The answer lies in the limits placed on the legislature
by the Constitution coupled with the charge of the judiciary to protect the rights of the
individuals and minorities against the excesses which sometimes take over a legisla-
ture.153 Hamilton, at least, and likely other Founders, were well aware of the tendency
of a majority to become a tyrant to the rights of the minority in any given instance.154
Essentially, it is the court’s duty to provide a “check” on the police power exercised
by the legislature to ensure the legislature does not overrun individual rights.155
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson did not trust a representative government to protect
the vague guarantees of personal liberty in the original Constitution,156 and insisted
upon the addendum of the Bill of Rights to protect the rights of individuals and
148 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Gov-
ernment, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.
Id.
149 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
150 Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (7 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
151 See TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 2.
152 See License Cases, 46 U.S. at 583.
153 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 119, at 336–37 (Alexander Hamilton).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), https://www.gwu
.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p7/p7_1text.html [https://perma.cc/8TFW-JL8F].
There is a remarkeable [sic] difference between the characters of the
[i]nconveniencies [sic] which attend a Declaration of rights, & those
which attend the want of it. The inconveniences of the Declaration are
that it may cramp government in it’s [sic] useful exertions. But the evil
of this is short[-]lived, moderate, & reparable. The inconveniencies of
the want of a Declaration are permanent, afflicting & irreparable: they
are in constant progression from bad to worse.
Id.
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states from the tyranny of the federal government.157 Indeed, he based the Bill of
Rights on a similar Virginia constitutional document which protected Virginians from
their own legislature.158 The role of the courts to limit police power is the characteris-
tic that makes the United States government unique and truly limited.159 Both federal
and state courts, to varying degrees, exercise their power of judicial review.160
Neither the understanding of police power, nor the exercise of judicial review
have remained static in United States law.161 Necessarily, when one grows stronger
the other weakens.162 The beginning of the twentieth century, with the rise of the
Progressive movement, saw one of the most fundamental changes and developments
in the concept of police power,163 followed soon after by a reactive strengthening of
judicial review.164 Over the past one hundred plus years, courts have continued to strug-
gle with how best to strike the balance between police power and judicial review.165
Police power at its essence is the ability of a government to regulate people and
things.166 It is the power to legislate, and without it, the government could not function
effectively.167 Prior to the twentieth century, the philosophy behind this power (as
exercised in the United States) was summed up in the Latin phrase sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas168 which, at its core, restricts regulation of persons and things to
laws which prevent concrete and specific harms.169 Essentially the role of police
power regulation was to ensure that one person’s enjoyment of his or her property
should not interfere with another’s enjoyment of his property.170 General nuisance
laws are an excellent example of this.171 Examples of laws which comport with the sic
157 Id.
158 Virginia Declaration of Rights, U.S. ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/char
ters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html [https://perma.cc/N8U9-ZK4Y].
159 Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observa-
tions for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 516–17 (2000).
160 Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887, 921 (2003) (“Courts of that era were simply understood to enjoy the power of
judicial review over written constitutions. And, just as important, the Constitution was made
supreme over unconstitutional federal statutes.”).
161 See Stephen R. Miller, Community Rights and the Municipal Police Power, 55 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 675, 681–82 (2015) (proposing five distinct eras of police power from the
Enlightenment to today).
162 See Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 159, at 513.
163 Id.
164 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (employing judicial review to overturn
state statute limiting the work hours of bakers as beyond the scope of the police power).
165 See Miller, supra note 161.
166 TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 4.
167 Dubber, supra note 139, at 1278.
168 See Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 159, at 511.
169 Id.
170 TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 4.
171 David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 46 (2003) [hereinafter Lochner Era
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utere philosophy in canine regulation are such things as leash laws, noise ordinances,
and mandatory rabies vaccinations, which are exemplified in the Sentell decision.172
However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a shift in philoso-
phy occurred.173 The restrained use of police power recognized in the common law
principle of sic utere,174 gave way to the newer principle of salus populi est suprema
lex,175 which allowed almost any regulation so long as it could be traced to some
improvement of public health or welfare.176 While sic utere might compare to the line
from Robert Frost’s poem, Mending Wall, that “[g]ood fences make good neighbors,”177
salus populi provides for more government involvement in the lives of citizens to
prevent anticipated problems.178 Under salus populi, legislatures could protect and even
promote health, safety, morals, and welfare leading to a much broader definition of
what is governable under the police power.179 Now, instead of preventing concrete
and specific known harms, the goal of legislation is to predict danger which may or
may not occur.180 Almost any law could be at least nominally justified by stating that
it promotes health, safety, morals, or welfare.181
The progressives of the early twentieth century relied heavily on the evolving
concept of police power in the United States, resulting in passage of laws regulating
business and the economic systems based on the goals of protecting health, safety,
and morals.182 As we will see in Part III, this expanded exercise of police power did
not always go unchallenged.183 The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vided federal courts with a tool to review legislative acts of the states and defend
against the exponentially expanding police power.184 The first question the Court had
to answer, however, was whether the Fourteenth Amendment provided the Supreme
Court the right to invalidate state laws, and, if so, under what circumstances.185
Revisionism] (noting the purview of traditional police power included such things as nuisance
laws, laws banning lotteries, laws requiring vaccinations, and Sunday laws).
172 Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 703 (1897). This case is
discussed in more depth in Part I, supra. The regulations upheld in the case are ones designed
to protect against immediate concrete harms, rather than imagined future harms. Id.
173 See generally Miller, supra note 161.
174 See TIEDEMAN, supra note 124, at 4.
175 See Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 159, at 511.
176 Id.
177 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, POETRY FOUND., http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem
/173530 [https://perma.cc/94S5-BUP9].
178 See Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 159, at 512.
179 Id. at 511.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 512–13.
182 Id. at 512.
183 See infra Part III.
184 See Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 159, at 533.
185 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A TOOL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. A Tentative Beginning to Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
Since its ratification subsequent to the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment186
has arguably become one of the most important developments in American law,
paving the way for advancement of civil rights and liberties well beyond anything
its authors could have imagined.187 While its place as a powerful legal catalyst for
change was perhaps obvious from the beginning, how the Fourteenth Amendment
would be interpreted and utilized took decades to develop.188
At first, lawyers arguing for employment of the Fourteenth Amendment latched on
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause to advocate for the protection of individual
liberties at the hands of the legislative power of states.189 The Slaughter-House Cases,
decided in 1872, illustrated this interpretation of the first clause of the Amendment.190
Petitioners in the Slaughter-House Cases, a group of Louisiana butchers, challenged the
constitutionality of a state law that purported to protect the health and safety of New
Orleans citizens by requiring all livestock to be slaughtered south of the city of New
Orleans.191 More particularly, the law granted exclusive privileges to maintain livestock
landing and slaughter facilities to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-
House Company.192 Petitioners argued that the first clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment which states that: “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . .”193 prohibited the
Louisiana legislature from granting a monopoly to one company and precluding
them from earning a living in their chosen profession.194 Petitioners thus read the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a check on state legislative police power.195
186 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id.
187 Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 999 (2012)
(noting the discrepancy between the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
value in today’s world).
188 Id. at 980 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment was ineffective as originally drafted).
189 Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 67 (1989).
190 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 37.
191 Id. at 43.
192 Id. at 36, 64.
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
194 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 43.
195 Id. at 53.
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The Supreme Court, however, rejected this interpretation that the clause pro-
tected citizens of a state from their own legislature, insisting, instead, that the clause
only prevented state legislatures from denying citizens of other states the same
privileges or immunities it grants to its own people.196 Specifically, the Court held
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that:
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that what-
ever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own
citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their
exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of
the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.197
From this moment forward the Privileges or Immunities Clause was rendered im-
potent in protecting individual liberties from encroaching on state governments.198
In its opinion, the majority focused on the main purpose of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as securing freedom, citizenship, and protection
from oppression for former slaves.199 While the Court did not preclude application
of the amendments beyond protection of the particular group they were ratified to
protect,200 it is very clear that the Court attempted to limit their scope, largely, it
seems, to prevent further erosion of the power of the individual states in favor of a
stronger national government.201
Specifically, the majority pointed out that, at the Founding, the ratification of
the first eleven amendments illustrated fear of too powerful a central government,
while the more recent conflict (the Civil War) had illustrated the dangers that
individual states can inflict.202 The Court expressed concerns that the petitioners’
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would destroy the balance of
power within the federal system.203 In so doing, the majority in the Slaughter-House
196 Id. at 73.
197 Id. at 77.
198 See id.
199 Id. at 71–72.
But what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any
fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments,
it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the per-
vading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy,
and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that
purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law
can accomplish it.
Id. at 72.
200 Id. at 54.
201 Id. at 78.
202 Id. at 82.
203 Id. at 78. Specifically, the Court determined that broad interpretations of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause:
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Cases lays out the central conflict which continues, to this day, to haunt the applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment—the balance of power.204 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment threatens the balance of power between states and the federal government, as
well as between legislatures and courts.205
While the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases laid out the argument for pro-
tecting state legislative powers,206 the three Justices dissenting focused instead on
protecting the rights of individual citizens.207 Justice Field calls out the Louisiana
statute as, at least partially, a pretext for giving special privileges to a particular
company, observing that while “[t]he health of the city might require the removal
from its limits and suburbs of all buildings for keeping and slaughtering cattle . . .
no such object could possibly justify legislation removing such buildings from a
large part of the State for the benefit of a single corporation.”208 Unlike the majority,
the dissenting Justices opined that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
protect citizens from the “deprivation of their common rights by State legislation.”209
Writing separately, Justice Swayne suggested the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments “rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta.”210 And that such
could never have happened where the states have all the power.211 Specifically, Justice
Swayne warned that the limitations placed on the clause by the majority defeat the
intention of those who drafted, voted and ratified it to provide protection from the
oppression by the states, and he feared the “far-reaching” consequences likely to
fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when
in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of
language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Con-
gress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the
States which ratified them.
Id.
204 David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 234 n.73 (2009).
205 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 82.
206 Id. at 73–75, 77–78.
207 Id. at 87 (Field, J., dissenting) (“With this power of the State and its legitimate exercise
I shall not differ from the majority of the court. But under the pretence [sic] of prescribing
a police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of
the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against abridgment.”).
208 Id. at 87–88.
209 Id. at 89.
210 Id. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
211 Id.
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follow.212 Swayne and his fellow members of the minority had the right to fear the
consequences of the case. To this day the Privileges or Immunities Clause is largely
irrelevant to protection of individual rights.213
With the Privileges or Immunities Clause now rendered powerless, the advocates
of individual rights moved to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in their ef-
forts to advocate for individual rights and checks on state action.214 The first major
case to reach the Supreme Court to consider these clauses was Plessy v. Ferguson.215
Plessy, which challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana law that prohibited blacks
and whites from mingling in the same railroad cars, continued the narrow interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment begun in the Slaughter-House Cases, ushering in the era
of “separate but equal” segregation that would not be abolished for another fifty-eight
years.216 Once again the Supreme Court found in favor of a state’s legislative power
over the rights of individuals, leaving the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment
in question:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from politi-
cal equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms un-
satisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within
the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
police power.217
While the majority in Plessy acknowledged, at least superficially, that “exercise of the
police power must be reasonable” and should not be used to pursue oppression of any
group,218 the question of what was reasonable was determined by looking at customs,
tradition, and what action would most likely promote comfort and maintain order in
212 Id. at 129–30.
213 David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 333
(2003) (“Since that decision, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the privileges or
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not itself the source of any rights, and
has turned to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for
protection of ‘fundamental rights’ . . . .”).
214 See id. at n.4 (citing to many cases decided under the due process and equal protection
clauses after the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases).
215 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
216 Id. at 551–52.
217 Id. at 544.
218 Id. at 550.
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society.219 The majority remained silent on the question of what type of law may be
an unreasonable exercise of police power.220
In his dissent, Justice Harlan prophetically opined that the judgment in Plessy “will,
in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott Case.”221 Ultimately, Justice Harlan was correct, a short list of the most vilified
Supreme Court cases in history certainly includes Plessy.222 Soon after the Plessy deci-
sion, the Fourteenth Amendment finally gained traction as a means of invalidating
state legislation.223
B. From Lochner to Legal Realism
Following Plessy, the next major development in the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment began with Allgeyer v. Louisiana,224 the first Supreme Court
case to invalidate state economic legislation on the basis of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.225 While Allgeyer was the first case, the most prominent (and most criticized)
of this string of “liberty to contract” cases was Lochner v. New York.226 The period
from 1897 to 1937 is most often referred to as the Lochner Era.227 It marks the period
of time when the Progressive movement gained power in the state legislatures,
resulting in an explosion of regulatory statutes aimed at promoting advancement of
219 Id.
220 See id. at 550–51.
221 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
222 See, e.g., Dr. Hans J. Hacker & William D. Blake, The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden
Yet Powerful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown versus Board of Education, 8 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 5, 5 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (“Perhaps the question most animating
debate among constitutional historians involves two vilified Supreme Court decisions—
Plessy v. Ferguson and Lochner v. New York.”).
223 Note, here, the historical context to the Supreme Court decision in Sentell, discussed
above. See supra Part I. The seminal Supreme Court case discussing the applicability of the Four-
teenth Amendment to protect the property rights of dog owners was decided in 1897, a year after
Plessy, and the same year as Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (the case that is gener-
ally believed to initiate the Lochner Era). This time period marks the transition between the
height of judicial deference to state police powers related to individual rights, and the emergence
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to invalidate progressive legislation. The era of meaning-
ful review of state statutes under due process or equal protection analysis was yet to come.
224 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (holding the state law which prohibited citizens from
contracting with an out-of-state insurance company unconstitutional).
225 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 351 n.27 (1989)
(citations omitted) (“While the era is sometimes dated from Lochner . . . the first case in
which the Court invoked the due process clause to strike down economic legislation was
Allgeyer v. Louisiana . . . .”).
226 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
227 See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 225, at 351 (describing the Lochner Era as a period
when “the Court pursued a doctrine of ‘economic substantive due process’ that constitution-
alized laissez-faire economic policy . . .”).
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health, safety, and welfare.228 Such laws ranged from work hour limitations for
women, to child labor laws, to eugenics laws.229 While progressives found power in
the legislatures, many conservatives remained on the courts, leading to sharp con-
flict in the courts over the proper scope of the police power.230
The Lochner Era was characterized by tensions between the progressives and
conservatives.231 Generally progressives promoted increased government regulation
of the economy and business, supporting labor movements, while the conservatives
preferred traditional capitalist laissez-faire economics, including protection of liberty
and property rights in the face of sweeping legislative reforms.232 In Lochner v. New
York, the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting bakers to work more than ten
hours per day was challenged.233 The state relied upon its police power as the source
of authority to pass the law, but the Supreme Court, led by its conservative majority,
228 See Richard Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Jurispru-
dence of the “Progressive Era,” 51 VAND. L. REV. 787, 790 (1998) (“During the Progressive
era, a sharp and continuous battle raged over both the respect to be accorded to property rights,
and the deference that the Congress, and particularly state legislatures, should receive under
the police power.”).
229 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a Virginia law requiring forced
sterilization); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (finding that a law restricting child
labor under the commerce clause transcended federal authority); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (upholding a regulation imposing a limit on hours worked by women in a factory
or laundry). Hindsight shows positives and negatives that grew from the Progressive move-
ment, and while the evolving concept of police power under the salus populi principle
allowed for a more active legislature, there is also a cautionary tale supporting the need for
judicial oversight when a legislature oversteps its bounds.
230 Commenting on the role jurists played in the Progressive Era during the battle over the
breadth of the police power, Professor David Mayer notes:
At most, what judges did in protecting liberty of contract was to apply
something like a general presumption in favor of liberty, a presumption
that could be rebutted by sufficient showing of reasonableness to justify
a given governmental regulation. Moreover, judges applied this presump-
tion quite inconsistently, in large part because the definition of “reason-
able” government regulation, and the definition of the proper scope of
government’s police power on which it turned, was undergoing significant
changes in the early decades of the twentieth century. Rather than limiting
it to protection of public health, safety, or order, some scholars redefined
the police power in terms of the amorphous concept of “general welfare”
to justify the activist regulatory agenda of the Progressive movement.
Mayer, supra note 204, at 224.
231 See id. at 275 (highlighting the contrast between “Lochner-era jurisprudence and the
increasingly influential Progressive movement that was challenging it in the early twentieth
century”).
232 See REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 43, at 39 (“[P]ost-Lochner Progressive
jurists consistently supported regulation for the purported public good at the expense of
judicial protection of constitutional rights, and preferred centralized government control over
many aspects of American life to liberal ‘individualism.’”).
233 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
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found that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part
of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”234 and “[t]he
right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected” by the Due Process
Clause.235 In its opinion, the Lochner Court implicitly recognized the tension be-
tween a strong police power and the rights of the individual, insisting that the police
power must necessarily be limited, or else all legislation would be valid no matter
how irrational.236 The invalidation of the law was largely based on the notion that
there was no more than a tenuous connection between a limitation on bakers’ working
hours and public health, safety and welfare, and the purview of the police power.237
While Lochner has been criticized on many fronts,238 some probably more
justified than others,239 it is one of the first strong articulations that the Fourteenth
234 Id. at 53.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 56.
237 Id. at 57 (“It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail—the power
of the state to legislate or right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom to contract.
The mere assertion that [a law] relates though but in a remote degree to the public health, does
not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be
held to be valid . . . .”). The words of the Court here are very similar to the language later
adopted as the rational basis test, in Carolene Products, that a law must be rationally related
to a legitimate government interest in order to be a valid exercise of legislative power where an
individual right is at stake. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–64 (1938).
238 Lochner has long been criticized for relying on principles of legal formalism. In recent
years, however, some scholars contend that the decision in Lochner was largely due, not to
judicial formalism, but to the majority’s reliance on the empirical and sociological evidence
provided in Appellant Joseph Lochner’s brief that detailed why there was no legitimate con-
nection between the work-hours legislation and the legislative goal of “health.” See REHA-
BILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 43, at 32 (“The most interesting (and likely influential) part of
the brief was the appendix, which provided statistics about the health of bakers. According
to . . . mortality figures from England, bakers had a mortality rate somewhat below the
average for all occupations. The appendix next cited articles from various medical journals
that recommended sanitary and ventilation reforms . . . but did not advocate shorter hours.”);
see also Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a
Myth, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 87 (2013):
If the Court gave short shrift to the health claim, it was not because it
approached the issue through deductive reasoning or abstract concep-
tions, but because it refused to defer to the judgment of the legislature
and insisted on its own evaluation of the underlying facts.
. . . The lack of scientific or other factual justification for the ten-hour
limit in Mayer’s brief for the State of New York sharply contrasted with
the approach that Frank Harvey Field and Henry Weismann, the attorneys
who represented Joseph Lochner in his challenge to the law, chose by
offering medical and statistical reports aimed at showing that ‘the
baker’s trade is fully up to the average healthfulness of all trades . . . .”
239 The Lochner decision has also been criticized both for its partisanship and its willful
ignorance of the relative bargaining power of employer and employee. See Cass R. Sunstein,
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Amendment provides limitations on state legislative police power.240 It also ac-
knowledged that it is within the Court’s function to answer the question of whether
a particular statute is a valid exercise of police power.241
The Lochner Court emphasized that mere pretext of connection between a
statute and public health, safety, and morals is insufficient to survive Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny if individual rights are at stake.242 In this discussion, the majority
harkened back to the minority Justices in the Slaughter-House Cases who believed
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place limits on the state police
power.243 It also struck a similar note to Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, at least implicitly,
in arguing that a state law could and should be held unconstitutional for violating
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.244
Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878 (1987) (“Above all, the Court’s concern was
that maximum hour legislation was partisan rather than neutral—selfish rather than public-
regarding.”); see also id. at 880 (“In the Lochner era itself . . . the police power could not be
used to help those unable to protect themselves in the marketplace.”).
240 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (“It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the
valid exercise of the police power by the State. There is no dispute concerning this general
proposition. Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the
legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that
any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the
people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the
claim might be.”).
241 Id. at 56–57.
242 Id. at 60.
243 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 121–22 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
244 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554–55 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Civil War amendments erase racial lines nationally and at the state level), overruled
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Harlan, however, also dissents in Lochner,
showing his willingness to invalidate laws in the context of racial segregation but not eco-
nomic rights. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 66–75 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In fact, of the five common
justices in Plessy and Lochner, four adopted opposing views on invalidation of the state laws.
Majority Justices Peckham, Brown, and Fuller refused to strike the racial segregation law in
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548–49, but did strike the limitation on bakers’ work hours, Lochner, 198
U.S. at 64. Contrarily, Justice Harlan supported the exact opposite opinions. Id. at 66–75
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Only Justice White remained seemingly consistent in his vote to
uphold both laws as valid exercises of police power. Id. at 66 (joining Justice Harlan’s
dissent); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (joining the majority opinion). Whether right or wrong in
the context of these cases, what is most interesting for purposes of this Article is that four of
the five justices opining recognized that courts had some power and responsibility to protect
the rights of individuals against the state.
Scholars continue to debate connections between Plessy and Lochner, two of the most
vilified opinions in constitutional law history, decided within ten years of one another and
by Courts with five common members, but which display clear contradictions in reasoning.
Conventional wisdom argued both majority opinions grew from the laissez-faire philosophies
that promoted a “hands-off” approach by the government, allowing market forces to work
to correct inequities. This view neglects the clear fact that the law upheld in Plessy amounted
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The Lochner opinion was vehemently decried by progressive reformers and
labor unions.245 While the opinion has long been vilified as an extreme example of
judicial activism and overreach,246 more recent scholarly attention has been
kinder.247 As David Bernstein notes in Rehabilitating Lochner, one of the most
crucial results of Lochner was that it required the progressives to support their
public health and safety legislation with, statistics, facts, and sociological evidence,
rather than mere pretext.248
As the saying goes, “winners write the history books,” and the same is true in
the history of law. Eventually, progressives gained power on the courts, including
the Supreme Court, and the Lochner Era came to a close with the decision in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish249 in 1937. Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, which char-
acterized the majority opinion as a vote to advance a particular economic theory and
a usurpation of legislative authority, rather than a protection of individual rights,
soon became the prevailing sentiment regarding the opinions of the Lochner Era.250
Even today, Lochner is viewed by many as a symbol of the most egregious
abuses of activist courts,251 and is still invoked to criticize judicial majorities that are
seen as overstepping that fine line between protecting individuals and interfering in
the legislative right to govern.252 In recent years, however, Bernstein and others have
brought about a re-evaluation of the Lochner opinion and noted that it was the
Lochner Court’s refusal to bow to the pretext of public health and welfare that
pushed Louis Brandeis to the legal realism strategy of employing sociological evi-
dence in his brief in Muller v. Oregon253 supporting limits on hours worked by
to government interference and not a “hands-off” approach, and that the overreaching state
law in Plessy arose from the expansive police power that the Lochner court explicitly rejects.
See Epstein, supra note 228, at 791–92; see also David E. Bernstein, Plessy versus Lochner:
The Berea College Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93, 93 (2000) [hereinafter Plessy versus
Lochner] (pointing to the varied scholarly views comparing Plessy and Lochner).
245 See Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 171, at 1–5.
246 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618–19 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing the majority’s “aggressive application of substantive due process breaks sharply
with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner”).
247 See REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 43, at 7 (“The history of the liberty of
contract doctrine should be assessed more objectively and in line with modern sensibilities,
and Lochner should be removed from the anticanon and treated like a normal, albeit
controversial, case.”).
248 Id. at 60.
249 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
250 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
251 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 529–30 (2015) (“But for many decades now, orthodoxy in mainstream conser-
vative legal thought has held that Lochner exemplifies a discredited and unacceptable form
of judicial activism.”).
252 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
253 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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women.254 The Brandeis brief, as it has become known, drew on empirical and socio-
logical evidence to forward its goal.255 Progressives believed legislative measures
should be presumed valid, thus, supporting the connection between means and ends
with empirical data was not so much a progressive idea as it was a response to
results in Lochner.256
While advocates in Lochner, and even cases before, employed empirical and
sociological evidence to support arguments,257 Louis Brandeis’s brief in Muller v.
Oregon continues to be celebrated as the beginning of the triumph of legal realism
in Supreme Court jurisprudence.258 Legal realism is a pragmatic approach to legal
reasoning that incorporates advancements in science, sociology, behavioral psychol-
ogy, and other disciplines to inform lawmaking and jurisprudence.259 In his 113-page
brief filed on behalf of the state of Oregon, Brandeis spent well over 100 pages
compiling scientific and sociological evidence to link the statute to the goal of
protecting public health, safety, and welfare.260 The brief cited medical studies,
bureau of labor statistics, historical texts, and sociological research, from the United
States and abroad, all pointing to the fact that women could and should not work
more than ten hours a day in a factory or laundry.261 Critics of the brief today will
surely point out it is rife with sexism and paternalism,262 but regardless of its faults,
254 See REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 43, at 60–61.
255 See id. at 60.
256 See Morag-Levine, supra note 238, at 87–88:
The incentives for including empirical evidence in the briefs dif-
fered substantially between the opposing sides in the case. . . . [F]or the
state, there was little reason to re-open the question regarding the law’s
justification once that had been settled in its favor. . . . Lochner’s
attorneys, by contrast, needed to refute the New York court’s finding
that the bakery law could reasonably be viewed as a health law if they
were to overturn the lower court. Their success in this respect forced pro-
gressive defenders of labor laws to return to the briefing strategy that was
reluctantly initiated in Ritchie and prematurely abandoned after Holden.
257 Id. at 77–81 (noting the use of similar briefs in cases concerning labor law prior to
Lochner).
258 Michael P. Ambrosio, Legal Realism, 205 N.J. LAW. MAG., Oct. 2000, at 30, 31
(“Inspired by the pragmatic philosophy . . . legal realists considered knowledge the product
of inquiry and the pursuit of solutions to practical social problems.”).
259 Id. at 34 (“The realist perspective is first and foremost descriptive, as it provides expla-
nations of what actually happens in a given legal system in light of the insights of the social
sciences, such as economics, sociology, psychology and anthropology. However, it is also
normative. It stresses the extent to which the moral ought to be influences practical decision-
making.”).
260 Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908
WL 27605.
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., id. at 19. For example, Brandeis, in the Muller v. Oregon brief, quoted the Re-
port of the Maine Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics, 1888, which stated the following:
Woman is badly constructed for the purposes of standing eight or
ten hours upon her feet. I do not intend to bring into evidence the peculiar
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it (along with other less celebrated briefs, including the appellant’s brief in Lochner)
changed the game on how to support (or refute) the connection between the means
employed by a statute and the goal of public health, safety, and welfare.263
The Supreme Court in its opinion in Muller v. Oregon tacitly accepted Brandeis’s
technique, acknowledging that while constitutional issues are not determined by a
“consensus of present public opinion,”264 where such information provides insight
into facts that may affect the constitutional question, the Court could rightly “take
judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge.”265
Not only did the Court accept Brandeis’s technique, the evidence he provided
clearly influenced the Court, which in upholding the restriction on working hours
for women noted:
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens
of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abun-
dant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to
injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to pre-
serve the strength and vigor of the race.266
From that moment forward, the Supreme Court would accept sociological and scien-
tific evidence to support facts and policy impacting constitutional questions.267 Today,
position and nature of the organs contained in the pelvis, but to call
attention to the peculiar construction of the knee and the shallowness
of the pelvis, and the delicate nature of the foot as part of a sustaining
column. The knee joint of woman is a sexual characteristic. Viewed in
front and extended, the joint in but a slight degree interrupts the gradual
taper of the thigh into the leg. Viewed in a semi-flexed position, the joint
forms a smooth ovate spheroid. The reason of this lies in the smallness of
the patella in front, and the narrowness of the articular surfaces of the
tibia and femur, and which in man form the lateral prominences, and thus
is much more perfect as a sustaining column than that of a woman.
Id. at 19.
263 See Brief for the State of Oregon, at Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107),
1908 WL 27605.
264 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908).
265 Id. at 421.
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing seven studies
and articles on the effect of segregation on the psychological health of minorities). Whatever
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern authority:
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almost any question before the Supreme Court will, at the very least, be supported
by amicus briefs that call upon sociological or scientific evidence to make the case.268
Policy is now a legitimate, pervasive, and important part of judicial review.269
In addition to the Brandeis brief, legal realism philosophy also informed the
development of the current test for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute in
conflict with individual rights, the rational basis test.270 First articulated in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,271 the rational basis test requires an evaluation that
the means employed by a statute bear a legitimate connection to the end or goal
intended to be served by the statute.272 The rational basis test is wholly pragmatic
and steeped in legal realism principles.273 It remains the primary test of the constitu-
tionality for a state law under the Fourteenth Amendment, or a federal law under the
Fifth Amendment.274
In Carolene Products, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Filled-Milk Act, an act of Congress that prohibited the sale, in interstate commerce,
of milk compounded with other fats or oils.275 The congressional act was premised
on evidence of filled milk as unhealthy and a fraud upon citizens who believe they
In Brown, the Court supported its conclusion that segregation generates
a feeling of inferiority among African-Americans by citing several
social science publications. And in Roe, the Court relied on several
medical, religious, and scholarly sources while discussing the safety of
abortions at different stages of pregnancy, fetal viability, and religious
and medical beliefs regarding the beginning of life.
Hon. Mary Murphy Schroeder, The Brandeis Legacy, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 722 (2000).
268 See Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism,
48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 305 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“Starting about 1910, legal realism—or
policy analysis—entered legal reasoning, to the point that today it would be unusual to find
a judicial opinion or brief that fails to explore the policy implications of an interpretation of
the law.”).
269 Id. at 316 (footnotes omitted).
Legal realism, also called policy analysis, or practical reasoning,
emerged from the British school of utilitarianism and the American
philosophy of pragmatism. It is an ends-means analysis that entails a
judicial balancing of the costs and benefits of a legal outcome. Legal
realism is a method of legal reasoning that determines what the law is,
not by invoking categorical legal principles, but rather by considering
the law’s probable consequences.
Id.
270 See id. at 316–17.
271 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
272 Id. at 152–54.
273 Huhn, supra note 268, at 316–17.
274 See Saphire, supra note 32, at 602–03 (noting that the “vast majority of legislation
operates in an area” subjected to rational basis review).
275 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 145–46.
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are buying whole milk.276 In upholding the Act under the rational basis test, the
Court acknowledged that facts and evidence may be provided either to show a
statute is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, or to show absence
of such relation,277 thus recognizing the realist approach to analysis under the test.278
In addition to establishing the rational basis test, the Court in Carolene Products
also suggested in a footnote that a more “searching judicial inquiry” than rational
basis may be used to address statutes that affect discrete and insular minorities.279
From this footnote grew the current method of tiered scrutiny.280 Under tiered scru-
tiny, most statutes are evaluated under the rational basis test.281 Those that, as the
footnote suggests, impede fundamental rights or impose upon “discrete and insular
minorities”282 are given “more searching judicial inquiry”283 in the form of strict or
intermediate scrutiny.284 From the decision in Carolene Products forward, the ra-
tional basis test was generally applied as progressives envisioned it, with extreme
deference to the legislature.285
276 Id. at 148–49.
277 Id. at 152.
278 See id. at 153 (citations omitted).
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitu-
tionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial
notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry,
and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of
a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court
that those facts have ceased to exist.
Id.(citation omitted). This shows, thirty years after Muller v. Oregon, the widespread accep-
tance of the technique of the Brandeis brief both for supporting and refuting the connection
between the ends and means of a statute.
279 Id. at 152 n.4.
280 There is no shortage of scholarly opinions on the interpretation of footnote 4. See, e.g.,
Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46
S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 179–82 (2004) (noting a variety of scholarly opinions on the footnote’s
meaning and interpretation).
281 See Saphire, supra note 32, at 602–03.
282 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4.
283 Id.
284 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) (explaining
tiered scrutiny); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a law prohibit-
ing interracial marriage under strict scrutiny).
285 Progressives of the early twentieth century were not great defenders of individual
liberty or civil rights at all. See David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism:
Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2029, 2030 (2014) (“Even those Progressives who were more favorably inclined to the
Constitution typically loathed judicial review. Progressives thought that judicial review was
undemocratic and that it put too much power over public policy in the hands of non-expert
judges.”). But some of their groundwork in free speech led to development, with the Warren
Court, of civil liberties.
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Because of the extreme deference provided to the legislature under the rational
basis test, in the mid-to-latter part of the twentieth century, Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence centered on arguing that particular rights were fundamental or groups
were suspect classes.286 Unless the challenger to a statute could achieve heightened
or strict scrutiny, the chances of successfully overturning a statute were effectively
zero.287 As the mid-twentieth century approached, the Warren Court pursued protection
of civil rights and liberties via the Fourteenth Amendment.288 However, by extending
Fourteenth Amendment protections narrowly, the Court was able to give the Four-
teenth Amendment power without falling back into the dreaded Lochner rationale.289
IV. MODERN APPLICATION OF RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND LEGAL REALISM
For over three decades following the decision in Carolene Products, the application
of the rational basis test by the Supreme Court became tantamount to a free pass for a
statute—if rational basis was applied, the statute would be upheld.290 The means/ends
test became a mere rubber stamp for legislative action.291 Only statutes reviewed under
strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny had a chance of being declared unconstitutional,292
and for a time, through the middle of the twentieth century until it named its last quasi-
suspect classes in 1977, the Court seemed to favor creating new suspect classes and
recognizing new fundamental rights rather than giving rational basis any teeth.293
The impotence of the rational basis test subsided slightly, beginning in 1973
with the decision in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.294 The case involved
a legislative amendment passed in 1971 by Congress that precluded households with
one or more unrelated persons to qualify for food stamp benefits.295 Under equal
protection, petitioners in Moreno challenged this classification treating poor people
living in single family households differently from the poor who may pool resources
with unrelated families and individuals.296 No suspect class or fundamental right was
at issue, thus the statute was analyzed according to the rational basis test.297
286 Cf. Saphire, supra note 32 (comparing the various levels of scrutiny).
287 See id. at 602–03 (noting that “most legislation is entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutionality” and thus “judicial invalidation” is an “exceptional event”).
288 See Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren Court’s Pursuit
of Equal Justice Under Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203 (2002) (highlighting the Warren
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
289 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
290 See Colby & Smith, supra note 251, at 544–46 (explaining the role of judicial deference
in the years after Carolene Products).
291 See Saphire, supra note 32, at 602–03.
292 See id.
293 See Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political Powerlessness: Equal Protection
Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. L. REV. 891, 894 (2007).
294 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
295 Id. at 529.
296 Id. at 531–33.
297 Id. at 533–34.
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Evidence existed in the legislative history suggesting that the amendment “was
intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating
in the food stamp program.”298 In its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged this
legislative history and unequivocally opined that such a purpose for the law, on its
face, would be unconstitutional because “‘equal protection of the laws’ . . . must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”299 This particular statement
by the Court would become important in subsequent opinions where other statutes
were comprehensively analyzed under equal protection using a rational basis test.300
Ultimately, the government argued that the statute should be upheld because it was
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, that being reduction of fraud
in the food stamp program.301 Specifically, the government asserted that unrelated
people living in the same household are more likely to engage in practices intended
to defraud the program, and the instability of such households makes the fraud more
difficult to detect.302 Instead of rubber-stamping these justifications, the Court called
them “wholly unsubstantiated assumptions” and struck down the statute because it
did not constitute a rational means of achieving minimization of fraud.303 While the
Court acknowledged that classifications need not be drawn with “precise mathemati-
cal nicety,”304 to be upheld, such classifications cannot be “wholly without any
rational basis.”305 The Court, relying on sociological evidence, concluded that the
statute only targeted the most needy citizens who were so destitute they could not
change their living circumstances to stay eligible for food stamps,306 and the statute
did nothing to actually reduce fraud in any way, since those persons engaged in
fraud would simply move to maintain eligibility.307
What is most unique about this opinion is the Court’s willingness to meaning-
fully analyze a statute under the rational basis test and not simply accept legislative
reasoning without a showing that the means were rationally related to the ends.308
However, Moreno, a seven-to-two decision, was not without its controversy.309
298 Id. at 534; see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8–9 (1970) (Conf. Rep.).
299 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
300 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (employing rational basis review
to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited any state action
intended to protect homosexuals from discrimination).
301 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 538 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 See id. at 535–37 (pointing to other provisions in the Food Stamp Act that already
address the government’s asserted interests).
309 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–64
(1996) (describing the confusion created by the animus standard used by the Court in Moreno).
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Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, favoring a more deferential
posture toward the legislature, as had become common prior to Moreno.310 Further,
Justice Douglas, who concurred with the majority result of overturning the statute,
favored implication of a fundamental right—freedom of association—rather than
overturn the statute based on a rational basis test.311 As such, Moreno illustrated the
ongoing controversy of due process and equal protection jurisprudence: should the
rational basis test be applied as seemingly intended, to judge whether the means is
rationally related to the ends? Or should it remain a toothless test requiring courts
to imply violations of fundamental rights or implications of suspect classes before
a statute could be called unconstitutional?312
A decade later, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme
Court would once again consider these questions, further solidifying the approach
in Moreno that, at least under certain circumstances, the rational basis test should
be more than a rubber stamp for legislative action.313 In Cleburne, the Court opined
on the constitutionality of a city ordinance that required a zoning permit prior to lo-
cating a group home for the persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities314
within the city.315 Petitioners had applied for such a permit, been turned down, and
subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming the ordinance violated equal protection by dis-
criminating against the intellectually disabled.316
The federal district court found that the City had a legitimate interest in ensuring
the “legal responsibility” of the organization running the home, and the residents living
there, as well as interests in protecting the “safety” and allaying the “fears of resi-
dents in the adjoining neighborhood”317 and controlling “the number of people to be
housed in the home.”318 Further, the district court found such interests were rationally
served by a special use permit.319 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit over-
turned the lower court, finding that the intellectually disabled residents were members
of a quasi-suspect class, the statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny, it failed the
test, and was held unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause
310 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 545–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring).
312 Compare id. at 537–38 (majority opinion analysis using rational basis test), with id. at
542–43 (Douglas, J., concurring) (implicating a violation of a fundamental right).
313 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
314 The term “mentally retarded” which was used by the Court in this case, is now outdated,
at best, and, more likely, pejorative. Today, it is generally replaced by “intellectually disabled.”
At the time Cleburne was decided it was an acceptable term and was used by both parties, the
lawyers, and the Justices. The term was even used by ARC (Association of Retarded Citizens)
and other advocate organizations. However, because the term is now considered to be offensive
to many, I have changed it in my discussion of this case to the term “intellectually disabled.”
315 Id. at 435.
316 Id. at 437.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.320 The City then further appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court.321
In its opinion, the Supreme Court quickly and emphatically determined that the
intellectually disabled would not be given suspect or quasi-suspect class status, and
that application of the rational basis test was proper.322 Although this usually would
have been a sign that the ordinance was about to be upheld, the Court invoked the
rationale of Moreno from a decade before.323 While acknowledging the general rule
“that legislation is presumed to be valid” and will be upheld if it is rationally related
to a “legitimate state interest” under the test,324 the Court noted that the relationship
between the interest and the ordinance creating the classification cannot be “so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”325 Thus, there must
actually exist a rational relationship between the ends and the means, and the Court
accepted a role in determining the rationality of the relationship.326
The Court, then, systematically considered each of the purported interests of the
City and determined that none of them justified special classification of the intellec-
tually disabled.327 First and foremost, the majority stressed that unsubstantiated fears
and negative attitudes of neighbors concerning the residents of the home were an in-
sufficient basis upon which to draw a classification.328 The Court continually pointed
out that the City allowed boarding houses, hospitals, fraternity houses, apartments,
and other multiple dwellings without requiring a special use permit.329 Though never
claiming that a resident of the Cleburne Living Center could not become a danger
to the neighborhood, the majority noted that the potential for such dangers are also
present when boarding houses, hospitals, and similar uses are allowed.330 Thus, there
was no rational basis to draw the line of risk only around the intellectually disabled.331
Similarly, the Court found that the City’s interests in “avoiding concentration
of population,” “lessening congestion of the streets,” avoiding “fire hazards,” and
maintaining “serenity in the neighborhood”332 while laudable, were not rationally
related to a law discriminating against a group home for the intellectually disabled
when apartment houses, fraternity houses, sorority houses, hospitals, and boarding
320 Id. at 437–38.
321 Id. at 439.
322 Id. at 446.
323 Id. at 446–47.
324 Id. at 440.
325 Id. at 446.
326 See id.
327 Id. at 448–50.
328 Id. at 448.
329 Id. at 448–50.
330 Id. at 450.
331 See id.
332 Id.
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houses were all able to locate in the neighborhood without a permit.333 Ultimately,
the ordinance was found to be based on irrational prejudice rather than a legitimate
interest, and was therefore unconstitutional.334
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens (who was joined by Justice Rehnquist)
took the opportunity to question the logic of the tiered approach to equal protection
analysis, favoring instead a single consistent rational basis approach.335 Stevens noted:
In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself
whether I could find a “rational basis” for the classification at
issue. The term “rational,” of course, includes a requirement that
an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classifica-
tion would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the
harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the word
“rational”—for me at least—includes elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the
sovereign’s duty to govern impartially.336
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Blackmun and Brennan joined concurring
in the result, wrote separately, disagreeing with the majority’s decision to apply the
rational basis test.337 According to Justice Marshall, the majority did not provide
enough guidance for lawmakers on avoiding prejudicial legislation, nor did it provide
sufficient protection for the intellectually disabled in future similar situations.338
These three Justices expressed a preference to affirm the Court of Appeals decision
which found a quasi-suspect class.339 Cleburne, building on Moreno, carefully consid-
ered whether the means were rationally related to legitimate ends.340 While the result
of Cleburne was unanimous, the concurrences show that the debate over the role of the
rational basis test and the tiered approach to equal protection was far from over.341
In the years since Cleburne, the Court’s approach to reviewing laws concerning
the rights of gays and lesbians seems to provide further evidence of the Court’s reti-
cence to find new fundamental rights and suspect classes, as well as its willingness
333 See id.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
336 Id.
337 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Marshall calls the
rational basis test “freewheeling” and “potentially dangerous.” Id. at 478. Very clearly these
three Justices prefer the tiered approach. See id.
338 Id. at 460.
339 Id. at 478. In supporting his call for application of heightened scrutiny, Justice Marshall
noted, “[t]he right to ‘establish a home’ has long been cherished as one of the fundamental
liberties embraced by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 461.
340 See id. at 446 (majority opinion).
341 See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text.
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to engage in more meaningful rational basis review, at least under certain circum-
stances.342 In 1986, the very year after the decision in Cleburne, the Supreme Court
in Bowers v. Hardwick343 took up a challenge to a Georgia statute that criminalized
certain sexual acts, including sodomy.344 Even though the petitioners who chal-
lenged the law encouraged the Court to extend the fundamental right of privacy
granted to decisions concerning procreative acts in Griswold v. Connecticut345 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird,346 to same-sex sexual acts, the Court refused.347 Additionally the
Court declined meaningful analysis of the statute under rational basis, finding “the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable” was a sufficient rational basis for the law.348
A decade later, however, the Court changed course on the issue in a string of
cases beginning with Romer v. Evans in 1996, followed by Lawrence v. Texas in
2003, United States v. Windsor in 2013, and most recently, Obergefell v. Hodges in
2015. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in each, authored opinions determin-
ing a number of statutes that treated gays and lesbians different from heterosexuals
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,349 culminating in the extension of
the right to marriage to same-sex couples in Obergefell.350
In Romer, the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment, passed
by referendum, that prohibited local governments from passing laws and ordinances
protecting persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation.351 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a majority of six Justices, opined that the amendment violated equal
protection, but would not grant suspect or quasi-suspect class status to gays and
lesbians.352 Instead, the Court, harkening back to the Moreno opinion, employing a
rational basis analysis, found the amendment “so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects . . . .”353 As in Moreno and Cleburne, the Court drew on sociological
evidence, including evidence of historical prejudice based on sexual orientation to
prove the animus behind the law.354 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, with whom
342 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
343 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
344 Id. at 188.
345 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
346 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).
347 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
348 Id. at 196.
349 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 620 (1996).
350 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
351 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
352 See id. at 631–32.
353 Id. at 632.
354 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Ass’n, the American Psy-
chiatric Ass’n, the National Ass’n of Social Workers, Inc., and the Colorado Psychological
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Justices Rehnquist and Thomas joined, argued that the majority failed to properly apply
the deferential rational basis test, and that preservation of traditional sexual mores was
a sufficient governmental end to justify the means of the amendment.355
Seven years after Romer, the Court directly overturned Bowers in Lawrence v.
Texas, when it struck down a Texas law criminalizing sexual conduct by two persons
of the same sex.356 Again, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, reasoning that an
individual’s “liberty” interest in making decisions related to personal choices of
marriage, family, procreation, and intimate conduct included protection for gays and
lesbians from criminal prosecution for intimate associations in the privacy of their
home.357 Kennedy called upon the long line of substantive due process cases includ-
ing Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade,358 and Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey359 to support the notion of a “liberty” interest protecting intimate
relations.360 While this opinion seems, on its face, to extend the fundamental right
of privacy to private consensual sexual relations no matter the sex of the parties, it
is interesting to note that Kennedy, toward the end of the opinion, wrote “[t]he
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual.”361 This language is that of the rational
basis test, not that of the strict scrutiny standard generally applied to infringement
upon fundamental rights under due process.362 Justice O’Connor, who concurred in
the result,363 based her decision on equal protection grounds rather than due process,
invoking opinions in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer to support her rationale that the
Texas statute had no rational basis.364
Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 19–22, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039),
1995 WL 17008445, at *8 (providing scientific and sociological research on the nature of sexual
orientation and discussion of “the literature on prejudice and discrimination against gay people”).
355 Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The law in Texas differed from the Georgia
statute discussed in Bowers, in that the Georgia statute applied to all acts of sodomy, in-
cluding between opposite sex couples. Id. at 566. The Texas statute only applied to same-sex
couples. Id. Because of this difference, Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lawrence, re-
fused to join in overturning Bowers, and rather reasoned to strike down the Texas statutes on
equal protection grounds rather than due process. See id. at 582, 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
357 See id. at 574 (majority opinion).
358 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
359 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
360 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65, 573–74.
361 Id. at 578.
362 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
363 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
364 Id. at 579–80. In explaining her rationale for employing equal protection grounds to
strike down the Texas law, Justice O’Connor quoted Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
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In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia, criticizing the majority, points to a
few oddities of the opinion worth noting.365 First, while the majority discusses “funda-
mental propositions” and “fundamental decisions,” nowhere does the majority
opinion clearly invoke a fundamental right.366 At first glance, this may seem a mere
oversight, because the string of cases Justice Kennedy uses to support the decision
supports a fundamental right to privacy that certainly could ostensibly include con-
sensual same-sex intimacy,367 but the second observation suggests this omission may
be more than oversight.368 The majority opinion never discusses the strict scrutiny
test which would apply to laws infringing upon a fundamental right, choosing,
instead, the language of rational basis in overturning the statute.369
Ten years after the Court’s decision in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s movement
furthered away from tiered scrutiny, and emphasized the intertwining of due process
and equal protection concepts in United States v. Windsor.370 This case, the third in
line of gay rights cases, considered the constitutionality of the federal government’s
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).371 DOMA defined marriage as an institution
existing only between one man and one woman.372 Once individual states began to
recognize same-sex marriages, DOMA effectively created marriages that would be
enforced and valid under state law, but which did not “exist” under federal law.373
Of course, numerous difficulties arose for married same-sex couples who were
treated differently with respect to common actions such as filing taxes or obtaining
health and social security benefits.374
In a contentious 5–4 decision, the Court struck down DOMA as unconstitu-
tional.375 Windsor is a long opinion, and though a great portion of it considers the
issue of standing, only a small section develops the Court’s reasoning for striking
which officials would impose upon a minority be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.
Id. at 585 (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
365 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
366 Id.
367 See supra notes 356–60 and accompanying text.
368 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
369 See id. (“Instead the Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of their
liberty’—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-
basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case.”).
370 See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–95 (2013).
371 Id. at 2682.
372 Id. at 2683.
373 See id. at 2682–83.
374 See id. at 2694.
375 Id. at 2695.
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down the law.376 Specifically, the Court found that DOMA “violate[d] basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government”377 and
was an “unconstitutional . . . deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”378
Calling upon this guarantee of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the Court was careful to note that the clause incorporated principles
of equal protection as recognized previously in Bolling v. Sharpe.379 Additionally, the
majority bolstered the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment by invoking
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence on the subject,380 suggesting that “the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right
all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”381 In fact, the Court
primarily relied upon the rationale of Moreno and Romer to support its holding, as
both equal protection cases employed rational basis analysis.382 What is most interesting
about this opinion is that the lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, had also struck the law, but employed heightened scrutiny to do so.383
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy never mentioned employment of tiered scrutiny.384
Finally, in 2015, the same-sex marriage debate culminated in the decision of
Obergefell v. Hodges, striking down state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and
extending the fundamental right to marriage to same-sex couples.385 Calling upon
concepts of “liberty” and “equality,” Justice Kennedy again twinned the language of
due process and equal protection analysis.386 While the opinion does not specifically
apply a rational basis analysis, it also does not employ traditional tiered scrutiny,
either.387 For example, the opinion drew a broad line around the “right to marriage”
376 Id. at 2684–89, 2693–96.
377 Id. at 2693.
378 Id. at 2695.
379 Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). In Bolling, the Supreme Court
considered the issue of racial segregation in District of Columbia schools, governed by the
Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth. In that opinion, the Court acknowledged that:
the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from
our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘equal
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfair-
ness than ‘due process of law,’ and, therefore, we do not imply that the
two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
380 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 2693.
383 Id. at 2684.
384 See id. at 2695–96.
385 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
386 Id. at 2602–03.
387 See id. at 2590, 2604.
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rather than narrowly defining the fundamental right as called for in traditional strict
scrutiny cases.388 In an even more obvious critique of tiered scrutiny, Kennedy
specifically eschews development of the law by “formula,” focusing instead on the
lofty goals of “liberty” and “equality.”389 Simultaneously praised for its “judicial mini-
malism” and criticized for its lack of clarity,390 Obergefell provides further evidence
that we may be moving away from tiered scrutiny, generally.391
In each of these four gay rights opinions, Justice Kennedy called upon concepts
of “liberty” and “equality” as symbiotic legal principles.392 The opinions do not find
new fundamental rights for gays and lesbians—though they extend rights of privacy
and marriage.393 Nor do the opinions declare gays and lesbians to be part of a new
suspect or quasi-suspect class.394 In many ways Kennedy seems to focus these
opinions in the language of rational basis review, even when fundamental rights are
involved.395 Some scholars believe the opinions show the result of judicial politics,
the need to write an opinion which can appease a majority of unique legal thinkers
or accomplish particular political goals.396 Some consider these opinions great
examples of judicial minimalism.397 Still others see a more conscious step away
from tiered scrutiny.398 Whether they have any direct precedential value outside of
388 Id.
389 Id. at 2604.
390 See infra note 398 and accompanying text.
391 See infra note 399 and accompanying text.
392 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (“Each concept—liberty and equal protection—leads to a
stronger understanding of the other.”); see also Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyn-
cratic Understanding of Equal Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 439, 439 (2014) (“Although Kennedy based his opinions on the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, he ignored the longstanding framework
of analysis that the Court has established for those clauses. Instead, he created his own idio-
syncratic view of equal protection and due process, a view that combined the language of
liberty and equality.”).
393 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
394 See id. at 2590, 2604.
395 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual.”).
396 See Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52, S58 (2015) (suggesting Justice Kennedy wrote the
Windsor opinion unclearly to initiate a circuit split that would eventually lead to another gay
marriage case reaching the courts in short order).
397 Farrell, supra note 392, at 440.
398 Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 530 (2014) (suggesting Justice Kennedy’s opinions in the gay rights
cases “might be taken to signal broader shifts in the Court’s equal protection doctrine generally:
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the realm of gay rights is yet unknown. But, the cases do signal that Moreno and
Cleburne were not stand-alone opinions, and that rational basis is not always applied
as a rubber stamp to legislative action.399 If the Court continues to avoid recognition
of fundamental rights and suspect classes as it has for the past forty years, meaning-
ful rational basis review of Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor may become
even more important in protecting individual rights from tyranny of the majority.
Despite application of meaningful rational basis review in Moreno, Cleburne,
Romer, and Windsor, the Court has been careful to avoid opening a floodgate of liti-
gation by remaining generally true to the rubber-stamp version of the rational basis
test.400 What then, made these particular cases special? And what characteristics will
have to be present in future cases to convince the Court to apply meaningful rational
basis? Upon closer review, Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor present a pattern
which may be indicative of success under rational basis.401 First, all four cases are
equal protection cases, but they also implicate some general form of a fundamental
right.402 Moreno seems to implicate freedom of association, one of the basic First
Amendment rights.403 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas calls out this right as
the proper basis for invalidating the statute.404 Similarly, in his concurrence in Cleburne,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, noted that the freedom to
make a home, a right related to freedoms of association and privacy, is a fundamental
right.405 Romer implicated the right to political participation.406 In fact, the Supreme
Court of Colorado struck down Amendment 2 under Fourteenth Amendment analysis
because “it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the
from a rigidly tiered and compartmentalized approach to a more flexible and (for those groups
not currently deemed “suspect” or “quasi-suspect”) robust review. Ultimately, and potentially
quite soon, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will face pressures to choose between
these competing formulations, as the lower courts increasingly show themselves willing to
deploy Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor in support of diverse constitutional claims”).
399 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (relying on Moreno
and Romer’s holding in the context of rational basis review in equal protection cases to
invalidate laws).
400 See Schiavone, supra note 26, at 33 (noting that it is still unknown if these cases
“provide direct precedential value outside the realm of gay rights”).
401 Id.
402 See infra notes 403–08 and accompanying text.
403 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“We deal here, however, with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment.”).
404 Id. at 541 (“This case involves desperately poor people with acute problems who,
though unrelated, come together for mutual help and assistance. The choice of one’s associates
for social, political, race, or religious purposes is basic in our constitutional scheme.”).
405 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (“The right to ‘establish a
home’ has long been cherished as one of the fundamental liberties embraced by the Due
Process Clause.”).
406 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996).
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political process.”407 Lastly, Windsor implicated a right to marry, which less than
two years later would be extended specifically to same-sex couples.408 Although the ma-
jorities in all four of these cases were unwilling to expand or reinterpret currently pro-
tected fundamental rights to include the specific rights discussed above, these rights
did seem to provide, at the very least, justification for treating the issue seriously.409
Second, opponents of the statutes in these four cases showed that the laws were,
at least in part, based on the animus of the community.410 At times, the animus was
clearly stated in the record, but more often than not, the Court implied animus based
on surrounding circumstances.411 Moreno had clear legislative history showing the
law was proposed to prevent fraud by “hippies.”412 While the Court in Cleburne did
not point to direct evidence of animus, it was easily implied because the law only
impacted the intellectually disabled and not other groups and residents whose
presence had the same likelihood of negatively impacting the neighborhood.413 In
Romer, the Court again recognized the implied animus behind the law, reasoning
that the extreme breadth of the law could support no other purpose than animus.414
407 Id. The Colorado Supreme Court relied on voters’ rights cases and cases striking down
discriminatory restructuring of governmental decision making to support its position. Id.
408 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“By seeking to displace
this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others,
the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”). While the majority carefully
avoided discussing the potential fundamental right to marriage in this opinion, the subtext
of much of the language of the opinion points to it. Two years later, the right was recognized.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“[T]he Court has long held the right to
marry is protected by the Constitution.”).
409 See supra notes 403–08 and accompanying text.
410 Moreno exemplifies animus in the form of a “bare desire to discriminate.” Susannah
W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 903 (2012). The animus
in Cleburne was characterized as “negative attitudes toward and fears” of persons with
intellectual disabilities. Id. at 909. And the Court in Romer “suggested that laws suffering
from a radical lack of fit would be presumed to be based in animus . . . .” Id. at 914. Animus
has been proven both by the legislative history or by inference because of the severe
misalignment between means and ends. Id. at 927.
411 See id. at 903, 909, 914, 927.
412 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973).
413 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
The District Court found that the City Council’s insistence on the
permit rested on several factors. First, the Council was concerned with the
negative attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200
feet of the Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly resi-
dents of the neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstan-
tiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding,
are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.
Id.
414 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). Of Amendment 2, the Court noted: “its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
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Finally, in Windsor, the majority similarly noted that the purpose of the DOMA was
“to disparage and to injure” and therefore no other legitimate purpose could over-
come the illegitimate one.415
Lastly, following the legal realism tradition, opponents of the statutes successful
in meaningful rational basis cases draw attention to sociological, scientific, and/or
empirical data to sever the rational relationship between the goals of the statute and
the means used to achieve them.416 Advocates use evidence in two ways: (1) to
prove the statute does not rationally achieve the government’s purported goals,
and/or (2) to prove the statute’s real purpose is animus, in the form of a desire to
harm a politically unpopular group, or at least displays irrational fear and preju-
dice.417 For example, in Moreno, the Court opinion drew upon evidence from the
California Director of Social Welfare on what types of persons would be most af-
fected by the legislation.418 The Moreno Court had clear proof of animus in the
legislative record, so the Court needed no further empirical evidence.419 In Cleburne,
the Court relied on sociological evidence to prove both that the presence of the
intellectually disabled in a community was not a threat to health, safety, and welfare,
and that the challenged zoning ordinance was an example of the disadvantages the
intellectually disabled regularly experience due to irrational fear and prejudice.420
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship
to legitimate state interests.” Id.
415 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By
seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living
in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
416 See, e.g., Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537–38 (using testimony from the California Director
of Social Welfare to show the regulations were aimed at “hippies” rather than people com-
mitting fraud); see infra notes 418–22 and accompanying text.
417 See id.
418 See id. California Director of Social Welfare has explained:
The “related household” limitations will eliminate many households
from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is my understanding that
the Congressional intent of the new regulations are specifically aimed
at the “hippies” and “hippie communes.” Most people in this category
can and will alter their living arrangements in order to remain eligible
for food stamps. However, the AFDC mothers who try to raise their
standard of living by sharing housing will be affected. They will not be
able to utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue to be eli-
gible without giving up their advantage of shared housing costs.
Id.
419 See id.
420 See generally, e.g., Motion and Brief Amici Curiae for Ass’n for Retarded Citizens et
al., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468), 1985 WL
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In Romer, opponents of Amendment 2 illustrated through empirical evidence the
following: (1) that sexual orientation is different from sexual conduct, and thus moral
approbation is not rationally connected to orientation, and (2) persons of alternative
sexual orientations are victims of pervasive animus.421 Finally in Windsor, opponents
of DOMA used sociological evidence to show sexual orientation is an immutable,422 bi-
ologically based characteristic, and that children of same-sex couples were not psycho-
logically or developmentally disadvantaged by their parents’ sexual orientation.423
Advocates seeking to invalidate a law under the rational basis test will likely
have a better chance of convincing the Court to apply meaningful rational basis if
these three factors are present: implication of a fundamental right, presence of
animus at the core of the challenged statute, and sociological or scientific evidence
that severs the relationship between the ends and the means of the statute. The next
section will consider why breed-specific laws meet these three factors and should
be held invalid under meaningful rational basis.
V. BREED-SPECIFIC LAWS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER A
MEANINGFUL RATIONAL BASIS ANALYSIS
Breed-specific laws implicate all three common factors noted in other meaning-
ful rational basis cases.424 First, these laws impinge upon not only one, but two funda-
mental rights: property and privacy.425 Secondly, there is ample evidence that many
of these laws are passed as a result of animus, not only animus against the dogs them-
selves, but more importantly for our purposes, animus against their human owners.426
These laws often arise to exclude or control certain traditionally disenfranchised
groups, including racial minorities and socioeconomically disadvantaged persons, who
669791 (citing historical, sociological, and scientific evidence concerning intellectual dis-
abilities, eugenics, and prejudice against the intellectually and developmentally disabled).
421 See generally, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass’n et al., in Support
of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008445
(providing scientific and sociological research on the nature of sexual orientation and discussion
of “the literature on prejudice and discrimination against gay people”).
422 See generally, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing
LGBT Equality (Gay and Lesbian Medical Association) Concerning the Immutability of
Sexual Orientation in Support of Affirmance on the Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-307, 12-307), 2013 WL 860299 (providing evidence that sexual
orientation is a biological characteristic that is immutable).
423 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Sociological Ass’n in Support of Respondent Kristin M. Perry
& Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor as Amicus Curiae, U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 4737188 (including significant reference to sociological
evidence supporting same-sex parenting).
424 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
425 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
426 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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are the stereotypical owners of targeted breeds.427 Third, and finally, emerging empiri-
cal data and evidence severs the connection between breed-specific laws and any
justifiable governmental goal.428 This evidence proves there is no rational relation-
ship between the goal of the statute and the means employed to accomplish it.429
Breed-specific laws involve classification of a group of people, those who own
banned or restricted breeds of canines. Such laws burden that one group over others
similarly situated by preventing the enjoyment of property, and in some cases seizing
and destroying such property.430 While the Court in Sentell held that owners’ property
rights in their dogs were “imperfect,” the case also acknowledged the existence of the
rights.431 Additionally, many of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have
agreed that dogs are proper subjects of Fourth Amendment protections.432 Seizure
and destruction of a person’s canine implicates property rights.433
Additionally, breed-specific laws may also implicate “the right to be let
alone.”434 This right which, in modern times, has been called the “right to privacy”
427 See, e.g., Hillary Twining, Arnold Arluke & Gary Patronek, Managing the Stigma of
Outlaw Breeds: A Case Study of Pit Bull Owners, 8 SOC’Y & ANIMALS J. HUM.-ANIMAL
STUD., 25–26 (2000) (arguing the media portrays pit bull owners as racial minorities, drug
dealers, “poor urban blacks,” etc.).
428 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
429 See supra notes 424–28 and accompanying text.
430 There are legitimate arguments that the legal system should not treat animals as
property, but this Article works within the current legal framework to analyze the issue of
breed-specific laws. This Article should not be taken as an endorsement of animals as
property, but rather an acknowledgment of their current status in the law.
431 See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 701–02 (1897).
432 A number of U.S. Circuits have agreed that people have property rights in their dogs that
are subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are available
against persons acting under the color of law that cause the death of a person’s dog. See, e.g.,
Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding the killing of a companion
animal to be an unconstitutional seizure of property under the Fourth Amendment); Andrews
v. City of West Branch, 454 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that shooting a dog within an
enclosed, fenced-in yard on private property violated the Fourth Amendment); Altman v. City
of Highpoint, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling that dogs are personal effects, and that their
destruction by a law enforcement officer is a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment);
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (opining that an officer’s shooting
and killing of a pet dog, even when off the owner’s property, can be an unconstitutional seizure,
when the dog shows no signs of aggression and its owner is in close proximity to the dog).
433 See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
434 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in
scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
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does not just apply to matters of intimacy and family planning; it applies to one’s
ability to live secure in the knowledge the government will not interfere in those
matters which most define who we are as people.435 The human-canine bond is at
least 15,000 years old.436 Dogs, some scientists contend, contributed to the evolu-
tionary development of modern humans as much as we contributed to the dogs’
evolution from wolves.437 Nearly sixty-five percent of pet owners consider their pet
a “family member[ ].”438 Where a statute calls for the confiscation and destruction
of a dog that has posed no safety risk, a dog that never showed the slightest sign of
aggression, a dog identified as a member of a banned group only by sight when a gov-
ernment agent enters a person’s private home, as occurred in Toledo v. Tellings,439
the right to privacy, as well as the right to property, is implicated.
Breed-specific laws are also, arguably, the product of animus. Certainly there
is animus against particular dog breeds endemic in the laws,440 but more importantly,
for purposes of equal protection, these laws are the product of animus against the
owners of such breeds, or at least the stereotypical owners.441 The war on pit bulls,
in particular, is characterized by elements of moral panic against the persons who
as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence
in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be
deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Id.
435 The Olmstead dissent became a central building block of the right to privacy. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (all citing to Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead
to support a right to privacy).
436 See Greger Larson et al., Rethinking Dog Domestication by Integrating Genetics,
Archeology, and Biogeography, 109 PNAS 8878, 8882 (2012) (finding clear signs of the dog
domestication process visible at least 15,000 years ago).
437 Brian Hare & Vanessa Woods, We Didn’t Domesticate Dogs. They Domesticated Us.,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/03
/130302-dog-domestic-evolution-science-wolf-wolves-human/ [https://perma.cc/HW5K-4Y2N].
438 U.S. Pet Ownership & Demographics Sourcebook, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N
(2012), https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Statistics/Pages/Market-research-statistics-US
-Pet-Ownership-Demographics-Sourcebook.aspx [https://perma.cc/8U46-AWWC].
439 Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2006).
440 See, e.g., id. at *7–8 (arguing the statute bore “no real and substantial relationship to
a legitimate state interest” and arbitrarily classified pit bulls as “dangerous”).
441 See Ann L. Schiavone, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Regulating Fear, Not Risk, 22
ANIMAL L. 9, 69–70 (2016).
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have so long been associated with these dogs—“gang members,” “drug dealers,”
and “urban youth,” groups that all point back to fear of racial and ethnic minori-
ties.442 Moral panics are the building blocks of laws based on animus,443 and the
Court in Cleburne has already established that irrational fear and prejudices that
characterize an unfounded moral panic are also illegitimate animus.444
Owners of many banned breeds, are perceived as members of “counterculture.”445
When members of a community do not identify with the owners of these dogs, it
becomes easier to strip away rights and privileges.446 When society views the typical
owners of pit bulls or Rottweilers (or other breeds) as morally corrupt, one easy way to
eliminate those persons from the community is to ban the breed of dog they prefer.447
There is no worry that an individual property or privacy right is at stake because the
person affected is not “like” the rest of the community.448 The mass media attention to
pit bulls as the dog of drug dealers, gang members, “lowlifes,” and “inner city teenag-
ers”449 likely contributed to the exponential growth of breed-specific laws.450 Owners
of pit bulls even display behavior of typical disenfranchised groups, attempting to
442 In Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Regulating Fear, Not Risk, I discuss how behavioral
psychology describes a ‘moral panic’ as an event where a portion of society becomes irra-
tionally fearful of a perceived moral threat that threatens to undermine societal values. Id.
at 69–71. As I noted in the article, breed-specific laws exhibit many of the characteristics of
other moral panics, including wide-spread media coverage, fear that outstrips actual risk, and
connection between the thing feared and perceived damage to the moral fabric of the society.
See id. at 66–67.
443 See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
444 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
445 Counterculture Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/counterculture [https://perma.cc/2WMM-ZCEX].
446 See, e.g., Jaclyn E. Barnes et al., Ownership of High-Risk (“Vicious”) Dogs as a Marker
for Deviant Behaviors, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1616 passim (2006). The authors of
this study attempted to link socially deviant behavior of people with owning “high-risk” or
“vicious” dogs. Id. Pit bulls and other breeds typically covered under breed-specific laws
were defined by the authors as “high-risk” or “vicious.” Id.
447 Id.
448 Twining, Arluke & Patronek, supra note 427, at 25.
Feeding this negative portrayal of pit bulls have been depictions of
their ‘owners’ that threaten mainstream America. Media reports of
attacks by these dogs were invariably accompanied by value[-]laden
descriptions of their owners as people whom ‘average citizens’ might
find dangerous. . . . [T]hese reports often described pit bull owners as
white thugs or poor urban blacks and Latinos who kept their dogs in
dope dens and fed them raw meat to make them as mean as possible.
Id.
449 See David Brand, Time Bomb on Legs, TIME, July 27, 1987, at 60, 60; Michelle Green,
An Instinct for the Kill, PEOPLE MAG. (July 6, 1987, 12:00 PM), http://people.com/archive
/an-instinct-for-the-kill-vol-28-no-1/ [https://perma.cc/R32P-3YDU].
450 Twining, Arluke & Patronek, supra note 427, at 26.
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“pass” or “cover” as non–pit bull owners.451 Further, animus against pit bulls has been
directly linked to racism and ethnic prejudice against the people who own them.452 Ulti-
mately, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status play a role in furthering the inherent
animus.453 We must be wary of policies arising from irrational fears that are disguised
as safety measures, not only because they are often ineffective, but because they
tend to strip liberties from identified groups with little or no detriment to the major-
ity of people.454
Animus against owners of banned breeds is also observable in the decisions of
courts themselves, not just legislatures.455 In Toledo v. Tellings, when the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld a pit bull ban, it did so in part on the government’s argument
that “the pit bull has been used extensively for dog fighting and by ‘criminal elements
of the population, such as drug dealers, dog fighters, and urban gang members.’”456
The Court also noted that police officers shot their guns more frequently at pit bulls
than at other dogs or people combined.457
The opinions in Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor show that motivation of animus
can be implied without a “smoking gun” in the legislative history through sociological
or other empirical evidence.458 At times, however, the “smoking gun” reveals itself as
it did in Moreno, proving the legislature was motivated by particular animus without
further inquiry.459 As noted above, the animus (resulting from irrational fears and moral
panics) inherent in breed-specific ordinances can consistently be proven through
articles, studies, and news media commentary.460 But, on occasion, there is also
451 Id. at 33 (noting that individuals from stigmatized groups will attempt to “pass” as not
part of the group, or otherwise deflect the irrational fear and prejudice they regularly face).
“Individuals from stigmatized, disenfranchised groups sometimes attempt to hide their
identity and to represent themselves as authentic members of the dominant culture. [Pit bull
owners] also used passing as a tactic to fit in with mainstream culture . . . .” Id.
452 Erin Tarver, The Dangerous Individual(’s) Dog: Race, Criminality and the ‘Pit Bull,’
55 CULTURE, THEORY, AND CRITIQUE 273, 273 (2013) (“The concomitant revulsion toward
both dogfighting and ‘pit bulls’ suggests an expression of fear of a perceived threat to norma-
tive whiteness, insofar as these ‘dangerous’ dogs are figured as carriers of the contagion of
racial abnormality.”).
453 See Schiavone, supra note 441, at 75.
454 Id.
455 See, e.g., Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2006); Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007), cert. denied, 2008 U.S.
LEXIS 2006 (Feb. 19, 2008).
456 Tellings I, 2006 WL 513946, at *5.
457 Tellings II, 871 N.E.2d at 1157. This “evidence” that pit bulls were more dangerous
than other dogs seems circular. Are the police shooting at pit bulls because they actually are
dangerous, or because officers have been conditioned to believe they are more dangerous?
458 See, e.g., supra note 354 and accompanying text.
459 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
460 See supra notes 440–44.
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damning legislative history.461 For example, during debate over enactment of breed-
specific laws, a councilwoman from Aurora, Colorado provided direct evidence of
animus when she openly pledged support for a pit bull ban because she did not want
“those people” moving to Aurora.462 Such a statement needs no further explanation.
Lastly, in accordance with the third factor necessary to achieve rational basis
review, opponents of breed-specific laws can point to large amounts of sociological
and empirical evidence that breaks the connection between the means and ends of
such laws.463 Numerous empirical studies have been published in the last ten years
considering the link between breed and dangerousness.464 The large majority of
empirical studies done, to date, reinforce the findings that breed-specific laws are
ineffective at reducing dog bites.465 The methodology employed differs from study
to study, but almost universally, the results indicate little to no connection between
breed and aggression.466 Many of the studies point to other factors involved in the
human-canine relationship that signal potential for aggression, factors which could
and perhaps should be the focus of public policy measures to reduce dog bites, but
which require a more thoughtful and complex policy solution than what breed-
specific measures provide.467
461 See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant Florence Vianzon at 14–23, Vianzon v. City of
Aurora, 377 Fed. App’x 805 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1434), 2009 WL 5069092 (C.A.10).
462 See id.
463 For a more comprehensive discussion of recent scientific studies bearing on the breed-
specific question, see Schiavone, supra note 441, at 37–43.
464 For a description of some empirical studies, see generally Stephen Collier, Breed-
Specific Legislation and the Pit Bull Terrier: Are the Laws Justified?, 1 J. VETERINARY
BEHAV. 17 (2006).
465 See, e.g., id. at 21 (finding breed-specific laws did not reduce rate of dog bites in the
jurisdiction); Karen L. Overall, Breed Specific Legislation: How Data Can Spare Breeds and
Reduce Dog Bites, 186 VETERINARY J. 277, 278 (2010) (finding breed-specific laws do not
reduce rates of dog bites); Belén Rosado et al., Spanish Dangerous Animals Act: Effect on
the Epidemiology of Dog Bites, 2 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 166, 169–70 (2007) (concluding
breed-specific laws had no effect on dog bite rates).
466 See, e.g., Rachel Casey et al., Human Directed Aggression in Domestic Dogs (Canis
Familiaris): Occurrence in Different Contexts and Risk Factors, 152 J. APPLIED ANIMAL
BEHAV. SCI. 52 (2013) (discussing the “relatively small amount of variance” of general risk fac-
tors (including breed) between aggressive and nonaggressive dogs, suggesting individual factors
“specific to the experience of individual dogs” are more important); Deborah Duffy et al., Breed
Differences in Canine Aggression, 114 J. APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 441, 451–52 (2008)
(finding “[d]ifferences between lines of distinct breeding stock indicate that the propensity to-
ward aggressive behavior is at least partially rooted in genetics, although substantial within-breed
variation suggests that other factors (developmental, environmental) play a major part in deter-
mining whether aggressive behavior is expressed in the phenotype”); Yuying Hsu & Liching
Sun, Factors Associated with Aggressive Responses in Pet Dogs, 123 J. APPLIED ANIMAL
BEHAV. SCI. 108, 109 (2010) (finding aggression correlated with variables in environmental fac-
tors, such as “dog and owner characteristics, living environments and owner-dog interactions”).
467 See, e.g., Gary J. Patronek et al., Co-Occurrence of Potentially Preventable Factors in 256
Dog Bite–Related Fatalities in the United States (2000–2009), 243 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
2016] REAL BITE 115
Beyond bite statistics, persons challenging a breed-specific law can point to studies
focused on canine behavior conducted to discover links between breed and aggres-
sion.468 A pair of studies from a German research team conducted an observation of ca-
nine temperament, placing nearly 500 dog-and-owner teams in a variety of settings
designed to potentially induce aggressive responses in the dogs.469 The researchers
noted no significant difference between breeds with regard to inappropriate aggres-
sion during the test.470 All told, between ninety-five percent and ninety-eight percent
of the dogs in the studies reacted appropriately to each given situation.471 Based on
these findings, researchers concluded breed-based classifications were not justified.472
Several epidemiological-based studies, conducted both in the United States and
abroad, have attempted to uncover and document the factors common to dog-bite
incidences.473 A survey study conducted in the Netherlands and published in 2010
surveyed 40,000 Dutch households about their experiences with dog bites.474 Survey
results implicated eighty-six different breeds in dog-bite incidents, and noted a wide
variety of circumstances and factors contributing to each bite, leading to the conclu-
sion that removing breeds from the population would not accomplish desired goals
of bite reduction.475 In another epidemiological study, a United States research team
focused on discovering the commonalities observable in the worst of dog-bite-related
incidents—fatalities.476 Studying 256 dog-bite-related fatalities in the United States,
the team found that a number of key preventable factors play a significant role in such
deaths, and noted the singular focus on breed has led to a failure to address the most
important risk factors.477 The team noted common factors in dog-bite fatalities such
ASS’N 1726, 1727 (2013) (finding co-occurrence of multiple factors make dog-bite-related
fatalities more likely).
468 See, e.g., Esther Schalke et al., Is Breed-Specific Legislation Justified? Study of the Results
of the Temperament Test of Lower Saxony, 3 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 97, 99–102 (2008).
469 Stefanie A. Ott et al., Is There a Difference? Comparison of Golden Retrievers and
Dogs Affected by Breed-Specific Legislation Regarding Aggressive Behavior, 3 J. VETERINARY
BEHAV. 134 passim (2008) (finding temperament test results of golden retrievers was essen-
tially the same as other breeds, including those frequently targeted by breed-specific laws,
as a result, Lower Saxony, Germany repealed its breed-specific law); Schalke et al., supra
note 468, at 99–102 (finding no statistically significant difference in temperament testing
results between typically banned breeds and other breeds).
470 Schalke et al., supra note 468, at 101; Ott et al., supra note 469, at 139–40.
471 Schalke et al., supra note 468, at 102; Ott et al., supra note 469, at 134.
472 See Ott et al., supra note 469, at 140.
473 See, e.g., Jessica M.R. Cornelissen & Hans Hopster, Dog Bites in the Netherlands: A Study
of Victims, Injuries, Circumstances and Aggressors to Support Evaluation of Breed-Specific
Legislation, 186 VETERINARY J. 292 (2009) (evaluating Dutch breed-specific legislation using
internet surveys of dog bite victims and dog owners).
474 Id. (finding multiple factors contribute to dog bite incidents, and many different breeds
can and do bite).
475 Id. at 294, 297.
476 Patronek et al., supra note 467, at 1726.
477 Id.
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as: incapacitation of the victim, the dog and victim being unfamiliar with one another,
the absence of the owner at the time of the attack, the owner’s neglect or abuse of the
dog, the owner’s failure to neuter (and to a lesser extent spay) the dog, and the treat-
ment of the dog as “resident” of the home rather than a family dog.478 Researchers
noted that a great majority of fatalities involved a co-occurrence of the identified
factors.479 In over eighty percent of the fatalities studied, at least four different iden-
tified factors were present at the time of the fatality,480 and in over sixty percent at
least five factors were present.481
While not specifically addressing breed-specific laws at all, another group of
studies on canine brain chemistry provide additional argument against these laws.482
Like humans, canines seem to show certain brain chemistry markers that predict likeli-
hood of aggression.483 Particularly, dogs with an increased dopamine level combined
with a decreased serotonin level exhibit aggression with significantly greater frequency
than other dogs.484 This is a factor not unique to any breed, nor prominent or even
common in any particular breed.485 It is uncommon, just as inappropriate canine aggres-
sion is uncommon.486 Like violent humans, only a very small portion of canines exhibit
inappropriate aggression.487
In addition to empirical studies disavowing the connection between breed and
aggression, two other recent studies, one published in the American Journal of
Sociological Research, and the other in the Veterinary Journal, found that humans
cannot accurately identify dog breed based on sight.488 This is even true for persons
who work in canine-related fields.489 Prior to the mapping of the canine genome,490
breed determination relied upon visual identification, unless registration papers were
478 Id.
479 Id.
480 Id.
481 Id. at 1732 fig.1.
482 Marta Amat et al., Differences in Serotonin Serum Concentration Between Aggressive
English Cocker Spaniels and Aggressive Dogs of Other Breeds, 8 J. VETERINARY BEHAV.
19, 19 (2013); J. Våge et al., Association of Dopamine- and Serotonin-Related Genes with
Canine Aggression, 9 GENES BRAIN & BEHAV. 372, 373–76 (2010).
483 See Amat et al., supra note 482.
484 Increased dopamine levels combined with decreased serotonin levels also cause aggres-
sion in humans. See Våge et al., supra note 482, at 372.
485 See id.
486 See supra notes 469–70 and accompanying text (testing aggressive behavior in
multiple breeds revealed most only showed aggression when exposed to certain aggression-
inducing stimuli).
487 See Schalke et al., supra note 468, at 101 (ninety-five percent of dogs acted appro-
priately at all times).
488  Olson et al., supra note 93, at 197; Voith et al., supra note 93, at 17.
489 Id.
490 Kerstin Lindblad-Toh et al., Genome Sequence, Comparative Analysis and Haplotype
Structure of the Domestic Dog, 438 NATURE 803 passim (2005).
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available.491 The potential biases or predispositions of the identifier were rarely
called into question.492 Whether a mixed-breed dog is identified as a member of a
restricted or outlawed breed depends entirely on the perception of the enforcer or
other observer or witness.493
In a 2013 study, 923 participants, all who worked in canine-related fields, were
asked to view videos of twenty mixed-breed dogs, and then identify the predominant
breed or breeds.494 Of the twenty dogs in the study, only four had a predominant
breed correctly and consistently identified by more than fifty percent of the partici-
pants through visual identification.495
In a more recent study by the University of Florida, researchers asked shelter staff,
including veterinarians, to identify the breed of 120 dogs entering the shelter.496 This
491 In some relatively rare cases, breed identification could be based upon registration by
the AKC, UKC, or other similar canine organizations. Breed Standards, UNITED KENNEL
CLUB, http://www.ukcdogs.com/Web.nsf/Webpages/Registration/BreedStandards [https://
perma.cc/EBX5-8XZ8] (advising that the standards be used by responsible breeders who are
familiar with breeds and by UKC judges, but not by the typical dog owner due to the
likelihood of misidentification). See generally Dog Breeds, AM. KENNEL CLUB, http://www
.akc.org/about/departments/ [https://perma.cc/2YAP-K7Z4] (stating that there are many
factors the Board must consider in breed identification, including accuracy of records and
proof of true breeding for generations of the particular breed in question).
492 See, e.g., Voith et al., supra note 93, at 24 (mentioning the possibility of identifier bias
in one sentence only, then undercutting that argument in the next sentence).
493 During debate over passage of Ontario’s breed-specific ordinance, Ontario Attorney
General Michael Bryant illustrated the flawed thinking of many government officials when
he responded to the argument of misidentification of breed by stating:
Those who disagree with the ban will say that there will be
identification problems. I don’t doubt there will be some issues on the
margins, but, by and large, I think most people know what a pit bull
is. . . . I’ve said before and I will say again, if it walks like a pit bull, if
it barks and bites like a pit bull, wags its tail like a pit bull, it’s a pit
bull. That is going to apply, I’m sure, to the vast majority of identifica-
tion cases. That’s number one.
Number two, everybody knows what kind of dog they own. Who
doesn’t know what kind of dog they own? If you own a pit bull, you know
you own a pit bull. If you know you don’t own a pit bull, then surely will
you have the papers to say, ‘This isn’t a pit bull,’ it’s a whatever, it’s
something else. Everybody knows what their dog is. So if they think
they’ve got a pit bull, then they probably have a pit bull. If they know they
have a pit bull, they definitely have a pit bull. If they have papers saying
it’s not a pit bull but an English bull terrier, then they don’t have a pit bull.
Public Safety Related to Dogs Statute Law Amendment Act: Debate on Bill 132, LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY ONTARIO (Nov. 4, 2004) (statement of Hon. Att’y Gen. Michael Bryant), http://
www.ontla.on.ca/house-proceedings/transcripts/files_html/2004-11-04_L084.htm#PARA711
[http://perma.cc/L96P-UWVG].
494 Voith et al., supra note 93, at 17, 21.
495 Id. at 17.
496 Olson et al., supra note 93, at 199.
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study, too, showed only a moderate level of agreement on breed among participants
viewing the same dog at the same time.497 Significantly, a full one-third of the dogs
that shelter staff labeled pit bull–type dogs lacked any DNA associated with pit bull
breeds, and an additional fifty percent of dogs that had pit bull heritage were not
identified as such.498
If the law cannot be enforced accurately or consistently based on visual breed
identification, is the law legitimate? Is the community concerned about a particular
breed, or a particular “look” of a dog?499 If it is the former, just enforcement is
impossible without mandatory DNA testing of all dogs.500 If it is the latter, then breed-
specific legislation can never accomplish that goal.501 Ultimately, these studies call
into question the basis of nearly every eyewitness breed identification related to an
attack due to the identifier’s subjective opinion of the look of the dog. Such evidence
is inherently unreliable.502
497 Id.
498 Id.
499 In his testimony before the trial court in Toledo v. Tellings, Toledo Dog Warden Tom
Skeldon testified that he was more interested in the “look” of a dog, rather than its actual
breed identification. Specifically, he testified that:
even if a dog was 50 per cent pit bull, if it did not “look like a pit bull,”
the owner would not be charged. On the other hand, if a dog did “look
like a pit bull,” it would be classified as a pit bull and the owner would
be subject to the “vicious dog” laws.
Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2006).
500 See supra notes 494–98 and accompanying text (arguing breeds cannot be determined
with accuracy based solely on visual observation, even by trained professionals).
501 See Olson et al., supra note 93, at 202 (“The marked lack of agreement observed among
shelter staff members in categorizing the breeds of shelter dogs illustrates that reliable inclusion
or exclusion of dogs as ‘pit bulls’ is not possible, even by experts.”); Voith et al., supra note 93,
at 24. The lack of agreement among participants in both the Voith study and the Olson study in-
dicate a fatal flaw in the law. Had participants been wrong about breed identification, but
generally agreed on that inaccurate identification, we could at least see that laws based on
visual identification alone or the “look” of the dog (while not actually “breed bans”) may be
enforced consistently, if not accurately, such that all dogs that “looked” a certain way would be
identified as included or excluded from a particular group. But significant lack of agreement
among participants in both studies illustrate that even inaccurate consistency is implausible.
502 Many of the same problems that cause unreliability of human identification by eye-
witnesses likely cause problems in canine identification. In discussing the limits of facial
recognition, professors Deborah Davis and Elizabeth F. Loftus note that
[humans’] fragile abilities are easily disrupted and contaminated through
a variety of internal and external forces: such as one’s expectations and
beliefs; the simple desire to help apprehend a perpetrator; the mere
passage of time; or suggestion from police, co-witnesses, media, and
other sources. Once contaminated, memories cannot be purified and
restored to their original state through purportedly curative, non-
suggestive procedures.
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Advocates of breed-specific laws would also have some evidentiary support to
bring to the table. One study concerning the severity of dog bites by pit bulls is often
cited to support the laws.503 Published in the Annals of Surgery, this study describes
the injuries associated with pit bull attacks observed in a level I trauma unit over a
fifteen-year period.504 After evaluating medical records at the facility, the authors of
the article were able to make a breed identification on approximately thirty-six
percent of the dog bite cases entering the center.505 Researchers concluded that
injuries sustained in attacks by pit bulls were generally more severe than those by
non–pit bulls.506
In a traditional rubber-stamp rational basis analysis, any evidence supporting the
law, no matter how slight, results in the court upholding the statute.507 However,
under meaningful rational basis review, courts have still found laws lacked rational
basis even where proponents could provide some support for their positions.508 For
instance, in Windsor, amicus briefs were put forth supporting DOMA with evidence
that children were psychologically and developmentally better off in dual-gender
marriages.509 But the Court found the presence of animus in this case trumped any
legitimate purpose.510 Therefore, where animus is particularly strong, it could preempt
otherwise legitimate legislative purposes.
CONCLUSION
Under a meaningful rational basis test, employing the principles of legal realism,
the court’s job is to weigh the evidence to determine if there is a rational link between
Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent:
Learning from the Past and Projecting into the Age of Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV.
769, 773–74 (2012). With regard to canine identification, all of these forces may contribute
to breed misidentification, but certainly the media hype, discussed in detail in other sections
of this Article, necessarily contaminates identifications of dog breeds.
503 See John K. Bini et al., Mortality, Mauling, and Maiming by Vicious Dogs, 253
ANNALS SURGERY 791 (2011).
504 See id. at 791–96. Records of persons admitted from January 1, 1994, through April 30,
2009 were reviewed for the article. Id. at 791.
505 Authors do not explain how the breeds were identified. Most likely, it was through
visual identification of a victim, a witness, law enforcement, or an owner. The accuracy of
those identifications could be debatable based on the above mentioned research. Id. at
791–94.
506 Id. at 796.
507 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
508 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
509 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Social Science Professors in Support of Hollingsworth
and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal at 5–
13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307), 2013 WL 457383, at *5–13 (providing sociological
evidence to support importance of dual gender parenting).
510 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
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means and ends. The instances in which the courts employed meaningful rational
basis concerning breed-specific laws, courts struck down breed-specific provisions.511
To date, the empirical evidence generally supports the argument that breed-specific
laws do not accomplish their goal of reducing dog bites, nor is focus on breed rationally
related to that goal.512 Additionally, these laws are implicitly based on illegitimate preju-
dice and irrational fear against the people who own pit bulls.513 Specifically, this
animus is connected to race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status of stereotypical pit
bull owners.514 If given the opportunity for meaningful rational basis review, oppo-
nents of breed-specific laws would have significant evidence at hand, in the equivalent
of a Brandeis brief, to support a finding that such laws are unconstitutional under a
rational basis test.
511 See, e.g., Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I ), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946, at *5 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2006).
512 See supra Part V.
513 See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
514 See id.
